Essays on multinational corporations, investment and economic performance by Kalkbrenner, Esther
  
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
Titel der Dissertation 
„Essays on Multinational Corporations, 
Investment and Economic Performance“ 
 
 
 
 
 
Verfasserin 
Mag. Esther Kalkbrenner, MAS 
 
 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
 
 
 
Wien, im August 2010 
 
 
 
Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:  094 140 
Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt: PhD-Studium Volkswirtschaftslehre (Economics) 
Betreuer:    Prof. Dennis C. Müller  
Essays on Multinational Corporations,
Investment and Economic Performance
The Effects of Ownership and Institutional Quality on Internal Capital Markets:
Cross-Country Evidence
Authors: K.Gugler, E.Kalkbrenner, E.Peev
Institutional Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Subsidiaries’ Performance
Authors: K.Gugler, E.Kalkbrenner, D.C.Müller, E.Peev
Acquired versus Non-Acquired Subsidiaries -
Which Entry Mode do Parent Firms Prefer?
Author: E.Kalkbrenner
Abstract (English)
Abstract (German)
Curriculum Vitae
The Effects of Ownership and
Institutional Quality on Internal Capital
Markets: Cross-Country Evidence ∗
Klaus Gugler†, Esther Kalkbrenner‡, Evgeni Peev§
Abstract
We derive empirical predictions from the standard investment-cash flow
framework on the functioning of internal capital markets (ICM). We test
these predictions using a unique data set of parent firms and their listed
and unlisted subsidiaries in 82 countries over the period 1988-2005. The
study reveals that company and country institutional structures matter.
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crucial role for the efficient functioning of ICMs. The larger the ownership
stake of the parent, the better the functioning of the ICM. (2) The best
functioning cross-border ICMs can be found in the sub-sample of firms with
parents from a country with ”strong” institutions and subsidiaries from a
country with ”weak” institutions. (3) Subsidiaries in Eastern Europe are
more dependent on ICMs than subsidiaries elsewhere. US subsidiaries
do not use ICMs. (4) Unlisted subsidiaries utilize much more ICMs their
parents provide than listed subsidiaries. Thus, ICMs are not per se ”bright”
or ”dark”, their proper functioning depends on how they are set up.
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1 Introduction
The literature stresses two opposing effects of internal capital markets (ICMs) on
the investment performance of group firms or group segments. On the one hand,
ICMs may substitute for missing external capital markets (ECMs), especially in
less developed countries (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). In the presence of capi-
tal market imperfections, subsidiaries/segments are able to access the funds that
parents provide (Inderst and Mueller, 2003), and they benefit from the access to
finance from other affiliates within the multinational network (Stein, 2003). Par-
ents may also impose discipline on subsidiaries/segments by reallocating funds to
those with investment proposals with a positive net present value but low internal
cash flows (Stein, 2002).
On the other hand, the redistribution of capital between subsidiaries or seg-
ments may weaken managerial incentives and lead to wasteful business activities
(Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Meyer et al. (1992)). Under the conditions of soft
budget constraints, ICMs allocate too many resources to firms with bad invest-
ment opportunities and too few to firms with good investment opportunities (La-
mont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan et al. (2000)). Some authors explain
ICM inefficiency by poor corporate governance (Scharfstein and Stein (2000a,b),
Glaser et al. (2008)). Others claim that the evidence of ICM misallocations is
an artifact of measurement error in Tobin’s Q used as a proxy for investment
opportunities (Whited, 2001).
In this paper, we construct a unique data set of parent firms and their listed
and unlisted subsidiaries in 82 countries over the period 1988-2005, and present
cross-country evidence on the effects of ownership concentration, country gover-
nance and legal systems on the working of internal capital markets. We seek to
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contribute to the literature on ICMs in at least four ways.
First, using a unique and comprehensive cross-country data set we study
ICMs in a broad multinational context. Subsidiary investment is analyzed as a
function of financial and institutional characteristics of both parent firms and
their subsidiaries. We utilize this variation and get consistent results for various
determinants of the functioning of ICMs such as ownership concentration and
parent-subsidiary country governance and legal systems.
Second, we extend the investment-cash flow framework to derive empirical
predictions on the workings of ICMs. We show that proper functioning ICMs im-
ply that parent cash flow (positively) and parent investment opportunities (given
there is a group budget constraint, negatively) should be systematically related
to subsidiary investment. The investment-cash flow literature was criticized on
the grounds that cash flow merely proxies for future investment opportunities,
and thus a positive investment-cash flow coefficient does not say anything about
cash constraints (see e.g. the discussion between Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) and
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000). This paper circumvents this critique by fo-
cusing on the parent cash flow influence on subsidiary investment, which should
be less likely to proxy for subsidiary investment opportunities.
Third, most papers on ICMs use firm segment data that introduce measure-
ment errors in the main variables (e.g. investment opportunities). Some authors
try to resolve the problem of measurement errors constructing a measurement-
error consistent estimator (Whited, 2001) or using plant-level data (Maksimovic
and Phillips, 2002). Our paper uses both subsidiary data and parent firm data.
Subsidiaries are separate legal entities and provide balance sheet and income
statements, thus we do not need to rely on segment data and can directly control
for the investment opportunities of the subsidiaries, e.g. via sales growth.
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Finally, we analyze simultaneously listed and unlisted subsidiaries of (listed)
parents. Carlin et al. (2008) focus on listed subsidiaries only and present evidence
in favor of the existence of ICMs that reallocate finance to member firms with
superior investment opportunities. However, unlisted subsidiaries far outweigh
listed subsidiaries in economic importance and presumably, one of the main rea-
sons why ICMs exist is to substitute for missing ECMs. Unlisted subsidiaries are
more likely to face cash constraints, and should benefit most from the workings
of ICMs. We find mixed evidence for the smooth functioning of ICMs. On the
one hand, we find evidence that ICMs alleviate cash constraints in the presence
of less than perfect ECMs. Parent firms do re-allocate cash flows, and the sub-
sidiaries with better investment opportunities get a higher share of the pie (i.e.
there is a ranking of subsidiaries competing for valuable funds). Investment of
unlisted subsidiaries is more sensitive to parent firm cash flow than the invest-
ment of their listed counterparts. Subsidiaries from “weak” institutions countries,
e.g. subsidiaries from Eastern Europe, are more dependent on ICMs than their
counterparts in “strong” institutions countries. All this is consistent with the
bright side of ICMs.
On the other hand, ICMs are costly in the sense that a large ownership stake
of the parent is necessary to guarantee its smooth working. We find that an
ownership stake of the parent of more than 20 percent is necessary to turn the
parent cash flow coefficient positive, and one of more than 45 percent is necessary
to get a ranking of competing subsidiaries. Moreover, the own (i.e. subsidiary)
cash flows remain significant determinants of investment, even in the presence
of ICMs. Thus, many ICMs do not completely solve the incentive and control
problems between parent and subsidiary - there is also a dark side of ICMs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our hy-
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potheses and the econometric modeling. Section 3 describes the data and sample
characteristics. Section 4 analyzes the econometric results and Section 5 provides
conclusions.
2 Hypotheses
2.1 Cash Constraints and Managerial Discretion
The Modigliani & Miller (1958) approach to corporate finance when extended to
FDI would imply that ownership and country institutional structures are irrele-
vant for investment decisions.1 This traditional investment analysis is depicted
in figure 1. With perfect capital markets the supply of funds, S, is a horizontal
line at r, the risk-adjusted market rate of interest, internal and external funds
are perfect substitutes. The demand for capital investment, D, is assumed down-
ward sloping. In the neoclassical theory, a firm’s investment depends only on this
demand and its cost of capital, and is independent of the size of its cash flow.
A neoclassical firm invests up to I∗, where the expected marginal profitability of
investment equals its marginal cost.
In contradiction to the neoclassical theory, imperfect external capital mar-
kets and corporate governance problems are major determinants of investment
behavior.2 The cash constraints hypothesis (CCH) posits a rising cost of capital
schedule once a firm enters the external capital market e.g. due to transaction
costs or asymmetric information causing adverse selection.3 With rising costs of
1See also Miller (1988).
2See e.g. Gugler et al. (2004), Gugler and Peev (2010).
3Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that firms may be cash-constrained because outside investors
have less information than the owner-managers about the true value of assets or investment
opportunities. Cash-constrained managers maximize incumbent shareholder wealth by forego-
ing some positive NPV projects rather than issue equity which is currently undervalued due to
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external capital the supply of capital, S, is dependent on the level of cash flows.
At cash flow CFa the firm is constrained to invest Ia. It under invests. If cash
flow increases from CFa to CFb the cost of funds schedule shifts from S(CFa) to
S(CFb) and the firm invests Ib . Thus, the CCH implies a positive sensitivity of
investment to cash flow.
Positive investment cash flow sensitivity is also expected according to the
managerial discretion hypothesis (MDH).4 Following Marris (1963, 1998), man-
agers’ utility U = U(g(I), p(I)) is an increasing function of company growth, g ,
which rises with investment, and a decreasing function of the probability of cor-
porate governance intervention, p. This probability is assumed to be zero at the
optimal investment I∗, where the value of the firm is at its maximum. As I in-
creases beyond I∗ the value of the firm falls and p rises. In Anglo-Saxon “market-
based”-systems, corporate governance external controls like hostile takeovers may
be triggered by such over-investment. In “insider”-systems as in Continental Eu-
rope, dominant shareholders, such as parent firms, may step in. Managerial
investment, Im, and dividends, CFm(Im), are chosen to maximize managerial
utility by equating the marginal utility derived from increasing company growth
by one extra unit of investment to the marginal disutility from the increase in
the probability of corporate governance intervention caused by the correspond-
ing reduction in dividends by one extra unit of investment. (In figure 1, Im is
determined by the intersection of the manager’s indirect marginal utility of in-
vestment schedule, MUI = (∂U/∂g)(∂g/∂I) , and the indirect marginal (dis-)
asymmetric information. Adverse selection can also lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Un-collateralized credit could be denied to firms if adverse selection of loan applicants
leads banks to choose an interest rate at which the market does not clear. See Fazzari et al.
(1988) for the first empirical tests.
4Managerialist theories of the firm e.g. Baumol (1959), Williamson (1963), Marris (1963,
1964), Grabowski and Mueller (1972) and the principal-agent literature (Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Jensen (1986)) question the profit maximization assumption.
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utility schedule, MDI = (∂U/∂p)(∂p/∂I)). A cash flow increase from CFm to
CFm′ shifts MDI to MDI′ : The decline in utility from incremental investment is
now lower at every investment level, because the threat of governance interven-
tion is lower when cash flow and dividends are higher. The optimal investment
for managers increases from CFm to CFm′ and dividends increase from CFm(Im)
to CFm′ (Im′ ). A control failure leads to cheap internal finance and managers
over invest. Thus MDH thus implies that the investment-cash flow coefficient is
positive.5
So far we have assumed that the firm is ”stand alone” in the sense that if its
own cash flows are insufficient to cover all profitable investment opportunities, it
has to go to the external capital market. Next we add the possibility that the
firm has a parent firm which it can approach for additional funds.
2.2 Internal Capital Markets
Figure 2 depicts the workings of an ICM between a subsidiary (on the left part of
the figure), which has good investment opportunities but a steeply upward slop-
ing external cost of funds schedule, and a parent (to the right), which is much
larger and is also depicted as having an upward sloping external cost of funds
schedule.6 If ICMs work perfectly, the parent firm uses own cash flow and avail-
able external funds and redistributes them to the subsidiary until risk adjusted
returns across both firms are equalized, i.e. until rS = rP . It follows that the
5CCH and MDH are also in line with a “life-cycle” model of the firm (Mueller (1972),
Grabowski and Mueller (1972)) according to which young, fast growing firms use internal
finance to mitigate transaction costs of external finance, and large, mature firms use internal
finance to maximize growth at the expense of shareholder wealth. See also Kathuria and Mueller
(1995) and Carpenter (2002).
6For the basic argument of redistribution of funds to the subsidiary with better projects it
does not matter whether the parent has also a rising cost of capital schedule or not.
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subsidiary can profitably invest more, ISaICM , than as a stand alone firm, I
S
a , and
the parent invests less.7
Figure 3 depicts an increase in parent cash flows, shifting its cost of funds
schedule to the right. Not surprisingly by alleviating the group’s cash con-
straints, this shift increases both subsidiary and parent investment, if the ICM
works smoothly. ICMs also imply that the parent firm allocates its funds across
subsidiaries depending on the relative value of each subsidiary’s investment op-
portunities. Thus, we expect that increasing investment opportunities of the par-
ent firm (or more concretely, the entire group except the particular subsidiary)
will decrease the subsidiary’s investment, holding the subsidiary’s investment op-
portunities constant. In Figure 4, we analyze this situation as a shift of the
parent demand for capital schedule to the right. The parent invests more and
the subsidiary less after this shift (given the budget constraint of the group). In
sum, we predict that ICMs lead to investment of subsidiaries positively affected
by the cash flows of the parent firm and negatively affected by the investment
opportunities of the parent firm.
2.3 Determinants of the functioning of ICMs
The functioning of ICMs may differ according to (1) the tightness of the internal
incentive and control structure between parent and subsidiary, and (2) the exter-
nal constraints faced by the parent and the subsidiary.
Regarding (1), the ownership stake of the parent in the subsidiary determines
the financial interest/incentive the parent has in funding profitable investment
opportunities of the subsidiary as well as its ability to control the operations of
7If the parent has a flat cost of capital schedule, its investment would not be affected by the
ICM and it would remain at IP
∗
.
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the subsidiary (e.g. via management selection, supervisory board representation
and the like). In fact figures 2-4 were drawn under the assumption that the par-
ent has a 100% ownership stake in the subsidiary. Only in this case should we
expect full equalization of risk-adjusted marginal returns on investment across
group firms. If the parent had, e.g., only a 50% stake in the subsidiary, it might
prefer a lower marginal return project conducted internally where it gets all of the
benefits to a higher marginal return project conducted by the subsidiary where it
only gets 50% of the returns. There are also a number of legal and tax reasons to
expect that ICMs work better the larger the ownership stake of the parent, and in
particular when it is 100%. E.g. wholly owned subsidiaries are tax advantaged in
their dividend payments in the US as opposed to partially owned subsidiaries, in
partially owned subsidiaries minority shareholder rights might complicate ICMs.8
Thus, the functioning of ICMs depends on the parent firm’s ownership stake in
the subsidiary: the larger this stake, the better the ICM should function.
Hypothesis 1. The larger the parent stake, the larger the parent’s cash flow
effect, and the more negative the parent’s investment opportunities effect.
Regarding (2), external constraints, country level factors, such as the legal
system, law enforcement, corruption, country governance, and the development
of external capital markets, determine how easy it is for the subsidiary to raise
capital externally (either external debt or equity; i.e. the slopes of S in figures
2-4) and therefore the value of ICMs. LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) sparked a huge
literature in law and finance analyzing country effects worldwide, however, there
is no study analyzing the influence of country factors on the workings of ICMs
in a cross-country setting. We expect that when parent firms come from coun-
8We want to thank all the participants of the Corporate Lunch Seminar at the Harvard Law
School in March 2009, who made these extremely valuable comments. See also Samphantharak
(2007).
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tries with high institutional quality and more developed ECMs, they can provide
better monitoring and finance profitable investment opportunities. On the other
hand, subsidiaries in countries with low institutional quality need ICMs as sub-
stitutes for the lack of developed ECMs.
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of the parent’s cash flow and the nega-
tive effect of the parent’s investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are
stronger for subsidiaries in countries with “weak” country governance and finan-
cial systems and parent firms from “strong” systems than for subsidiaries from
countries with other parent-subsidiary pairs.
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of the parent’s cash flow and the nega-
tive effect of the parent’s investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are
stronger for subsidiaries in countries with “weak” legal systems and parent firms
from “strong” legal systems than for subsidiaries from countries with other parent-
subsidiary pairs.
As a corollary, one may test whether subsidiaries in Eastern Europe are more
dependent on ICMs than subsidiaries in Western Europe and the US. In Eastern
Europe, the institutional environment has several key characteristics conducive
to ICMs (Mueller and Peev, 2007). While the written law is similar to or even
better than in EU-15 countries, law enforcement is rather inefficient.9 Despite
major differences in privatization policies, the striking outcome of transition is
high ownership concentration (Bergloef and Bolton, 2002), and the major cor-
porate governance conflict is between the controlling shareholder and minority
shareholders (Bergloef and Pajuste, 2003). Most stock exchanges are very illiq-
uid and only a small number of firms are actively traded. Bank-based financial
systems have emerged with foreign-owned commercial banks prevailing. Thus,
9See e.g. Pistor (2000).
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ICMs can be expected to play a large role in transition countries.
Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of the parent’s cash flow and the nega-
tive effect of the parent’s investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are
stronger for subsidiaries from countries in Eastern Europe than for subsidiaries
in Western Europe and the US.
Whether the subsidiary is listed or not is somewhat between (1) and (2).
Listing of course entails a dispersion of ownership, so that we move away from
the wholly owned subsidiary. Listing on a stock exchange also means minority
shareholder rights and much stricter transparency. The legal form of a listed
subsidiary usually is a joint stock corporation, which gives it much more auton-
omy in decision making vis a vis the parent (e.g. it is not bound by directives).
Thus, we expect a much looser relation between parents and listed subsidiaries
than between parents and unlisted subsidiaries. Moreover, listing may also affect
the external constraints faced by the subsidiary: Listed subsidiaries do not need
ICMs as much as unlisted subsidiaries do, since ECMs substitute for them. It is
very likely that the asymmetry of information for listed subsidiaries is much lower
than for unlisted subsidiaries: their shares are traded daily on the stock exchange,
they are covered by a number of analysts, they provide quarterly company re-
ports, and they are likely to be much larger than their unlisted counterparts.
Moreover, unlisted firms have not gone to the stock exchange in the first place,
because, presumably, asymmetry of information is particularly severe for them
so that under-pricing of assets would occur. Thus, we expect that ICMs play a
larger role for unlisted subsidiaries than for listed subsidiaries.
Hypothesis 5. The positive effect of the parent’s cash flow and the nega-
tive effect of the parent’s investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are
stronger for unlisted subsidiaries than for listed subsidiaries.
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2.4 Econometric Modeling
We test these predictions by estimating simple investment accelerator-cash flow
models similar to those used by Shin and Stulz (1998), Chevallier (2004) and
Carlin et al. (2008):
ISt = α + βSSGS,t + βPSGP,t + γPQP,t + δSCFS,t−1 + δPCFP,t−1 + S,t (1)
Whereby, IS,t is defined as the investment of the subsidiary at time t divided by
total assets; SGS,t is defined as the sales growth rate of the subsidiary at time t;
SGP,t is the sales growth rate of the parent at time t; CFS,t−1 is the cash flow of
the subsidiary at time t-1 and CFP,t−1 is the cash flow of the parent at time t-1;
QP,t reflects the Tobin’s Q of the parent at time t. We measure investment as
the change in fixed assets, cash flow as the profit/loss of a firm plus depreciation,
Tobin’s Q as market capitalization plus long term debt over total assets, and
sales growth as the log difference between sales from one period to the other.
The coefficients of main interest are γP and δP . A negative γP implies a
ranking of subsidiaries, such that if the investment opportunities of the whole
group go up relative to the investment opportunities of the subsidiary under study,
the investment of the subsidiary should go down, since funds are redistributed
within the group. A positive δP implies that parent funds are used to finance
subsidiary investment.
3 Data
We construct a unique data set containing data from two databases, Amadeus
and Osiris, provided by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing. Bureau von Dijk
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combines several information sources, like company registers, annual reports,
stock exchanges etc., to establish the two databases, and Amadeus and Osiris
assign unique identification numbers to each company. Using this identification
key, it was possible to interlink the two databases. Amadeus contains ownership
and financial firm-level data for mainly unlisted companies from 38 European
countries, while Osiris contains ownership and financial firm-level data for listed
companies for around 120 countries. We use the ownership structure provided
by Osiris and add financial data for unlisted subsidiaries from Amadeus, and so
construct a panel using both databases for the years 1988-2005. Thus, we are
able to identify 8,677 parent firms, 9,699 listed and 39,346 unlisted subsidiaries.10
We evaluate the quality of a country’s institutions using the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. We average the six indexes: (1)
voice and accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government effectiveness, (4)
regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. The indica-
tors are constructed using the unobserved components methodology described in
Kaufmann et al. (2005). The indicators are measured in units ranging from -2.5
to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. We also classify
countries by their legal origin using LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) typology, namely:
Anglo-Saxon, German, French, and Scandinavian. Transition countries form a
separate fifth group.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by countries classified by the five legal
origin systems. For any country we present the number of listed and unlisted
subsidiaries, number of parent firms and the country average institutional qual-
ity index. On average, countries in the Scandinavian legal family group have
10Due to the requirement that parents hold 50% or more of the subsidiary and missing balance
sheet data the number of firms and observations are much lower in the regression analysis that
follows.
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the highest institutional quality score (1.75), while transition countries show the
lowest (0.23).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables by parent firms,
listed and unlisted subsidiaries. On average, the investment ratio is higher for
listed than unlisted subsidiaries, and it is largest for parent firms. Internally
generated cash flow is 8.3% of assets in listed, 8% in unlisted subsidiaries, and
7.3% in parent firms. While average sales growth is smaller for parent firms than
for either type of subsidiary, parents’ average Tobin’s Q is larger than for listed
subsidiaries. Not surprisingly, on average, listed subsidiaries are much larger than
unlisted subsidiaries in terms of number of employees, and parent firms are by
far the largest. Parents on average hold around 2/3 of the equity in listed, and
94% in unlisted subsidiaries.
The sample contains data from two databases, Amadeus and Osiris, provided
by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing. Bureau von Dijk combines several
information sources, like company registers, annual reports, stock exchanges etc.,
to establish the two databases, whereby a unique identification number is assigned
to each company. Using this identification key, it was possible to interlink the two
databases. Amadeus contains ownership and financial firm-level data for mainly
unlisted companies from 38 European countries, while Osiris contains ownership
and financial firm-level data for listed companies for around 120 countries. We
use the ownership structure provided by Osiris and add financial data for unlisted
subsidiaries from Amadeus. A panel is constructed using both databases for the
years 1988-2005. Thus, we are able to identify 8,677 parent firms, 9,699 listed
and 39,346 unlisted subsidiaries.
We evaluate the quality of a country’s institutions as the average of six in-
dexes: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government effec-
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tiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption.
The indicators are constructed using the unobserved components methodology
described in Kaufmann et al. (2005). The indicators are measured in units rang-
ing from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. We
also classify countries by their legal origin using LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) ty-
pology, namely: Anglo-Saxon, German, French, and Scandinavian. Transition
countries form a separate fifth group.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by countries classified by the five legal
systems. For any country we present the number of listed and unlisted sub-
sidiaries, number of parent firms and the country average institutional quality
index. On average, countries in the Scandinavian legal family group have the
highest institutional quality score (1.75), while transition countries show the low-
est score (0.23).
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables by parent firms,
listed and unlisted subsidiaries. On average, the investment ratio is higher for
listed than unlisted subsidiaries but it is largest for parent firms. Internally
generated cash flow is 8.3 % of assets in listed, 8% in unlisted subsidiaries, and
7.3% in their parents. While average sales growth is smaller for parent firms
than for either type of subsidiary, parents’ Tobin’s q is larger than for listed
subsidiaries. Not surprisingly, on average, listed subsidiaries are much larger
than unlisted subsidiaries in terms of number of employees, and parent firms are
by far the largest. Parents on average hold around 2/3 of the equity in listed,
but 94% in unlisted subsidiaries.
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4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Main results on internal capital markets
Table 3 includes only subsidiaries, where the parent firm owns more than 50%
of the equity, so these are “true” subsidiaries and they are consolidated with
the parent firm (9,018 subsidiaries, 2,048 parents; 34,937 observations). Parent
cash flow displays a positive, sizeable (0.10), and significant (t = 8.9) coefficient,
pointing to a financial relation between parent and subsidiary. Moreover, parent
Tobin’s Q has a negative and significant coefficient: the larger the investment
opportunities of the parent firm compared to the subsidiary, the lower the in-
vestment rate of the subsidiary. Both coefficients together imply that funds for
investment are redistributed within the group, and the redistribution of funds is
responsive to investment opportunities. However, ICMs do not appear to work
perfectly, since own (i.e. subsidiary) cash flow has a positive, large (0.15) and
significant coefficient.
Before further discussing the determinants of the functioning of ICMs, we
present some robustness estimates in columns two and three of Table 3. There are
severe methodological problems measuring the diversification decisions of firms
(for a survey see Martin and Sayrak (2003), e.g. there is a selection problem.11
Internal capital markets are only observed for the selected sample of firms with
parents. There is no ICM of a firm, which is not a subsidiary. We can address
this problem via Heckman’s selection correction model, where in the first stage
11For a critical view see e.g. Chevallier (2004). She finds out that the investment patterns
that the literature has attributed to cross-subsidization between divisions of conglomerates are
already apparent in the pairs of merging firms prior to their mergers. She argues that unknown
relatedness between firms but no internal capital markets may drive the relationship between
cash flow of one firm (segment) and the investment of the other in the study by Shin and Stulz
(1998).
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a probit model is used to predict the probability of being a subsidiary and in
the second stage the inverse Mills’ ratio is included as a regressor. We address
the issue of possible endogeneity by applying the General Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator.
In Table 3, OLS estimates are compared to GMM and Heckman estimates.
All qualitative results carry over. The GMM model estimates the regression aug-
menting it by a lagged dependent variable using the systems GMM estimator
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). This estimator eliminates firm fixed effects by first-differencing
as well as controls for possible endogeneity of current explanatory variables. En-
dogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid instruments provided
that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic
error terms.12 The Sargan tests do not suggest rejection of the over-identifying
restrictions at conventional levels. While there is evidence of first order serial
correlation in the residuals, the AR(2) test statistics reveal absence of second
order serial correlation in the first differenced errors. Our GMM estimates there-
fore use variables lagged by two or more periods as instruments. With GMM, the
coefficients on own and parent cash flow remain positive and significant, although
their sizes diminish. Parent Tobin’s q retains its negative coefficient (although it
becomes insignificant). Thus, endogeneity does not seem to be a major issue in
our regressions.
Column 3 presents the Heckman results, which are nearly identical to the OLS
results, indicating that accounting for possible selection biases does not change
our main results. The first stage results (see bottom of table 3) indicate that
12Of course, it would be preferable to use a set of truly independent instrumental variables
(IV) instead. It was, however, impossible for us to identify and collect a set of IVs that varies
across firms and time and that is uniformly valid for all countries in the sample.
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subsidiaries tend to be larger, more profitable but slower growing than stand
alone firms. Moreover, they are more likely to be located in Eastern and Western
Europe rather than in the US or other parts of the world. While the inverse Mills
ratio (the non-selection hazard) is significant in the investment equation, there is
only marginal correlation in the error terms (rho = -0.05).
In sum, we do find that ICMs are at work. Parent cash flows positively affect
subsidiary investment and parents ”rank” their subsidiaries according to invest-
ment opportunities in the face of an overall group capital budget constraint.
4.2 Ownership concentration and internal capital markets
Table 4 analyzes whether the size of the control stake of the parent firm matters.
Hypothesis 1 states that the larger the percentage holdings of the parent in the
subsidiary, the better the ICM works, since fewer incentive and control (and le-
gal and tax) problems arise. The extreme case is a 100% owned subsidiary: the
residual claimant (i.e. the parent) gets all the benefits and bears all the costs
of its actions (e.g. funding and monitoring), so there is no corporate governance
problem. We tackle this issue in two ways. The first column of the table presents
a regression using interaction terms of parent Tobin’s q and the two cash flow
terms with parent ownership stake. This specification assumes a continuous and
linear relation between the strength of the ICM and the parent’s ownership stake.
The second column analyzes (1) companies with parent ownership stake below
50% 13, (2) between 50% and 99.9% (majority-controlled subsidiaries), and (3)
wholly owned subsidiaries (the base category).
The results are striking. The interaction term of parent Tobin’s Q and own-
13Actually, one would not want to call these firms subsidiaries, these are rather equity par-
ticipants.
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ership stake is negative and significant, thus the larger the interest of the parent
in the subsidiary, the larger the role of internal rankings according to investment
opportunities (see column 1). The impact of parent Tobin’s Q on subsidiary
investment becomes negative at a 45% parent ownership stake. The interaction
term of parent ownership and parent cash flow is significantly positive: The larger
the interest of the parent in the subsidiary, the more parent cash flow is used for
funding subsidiary investment. The impact of parent cash flow becomes positive
at around 20% ownership, and it is 0.1 at a parent ownership of 92%. The inter-
action term between own (subsidiary) cash flow and parent stake is significantly
negative, thus the larger the interest of the parent in the subsidiary, the fewer
cash constraints and/or managerial discretion problems the subsidiary faces, pre-
sumably because ICMs get more efficient.
Consistently, for the sub-sample of firms where the parent owns less than 50%,
there is no ICM. ”Parent” Q is even positive and significant, parent cash flow
is insignificant, and the own cash flow influence (0.27) is particularly large for
this sub-sample (see column 2). In contrast, both parent cash flow and Tobin’s
Q coefficients in the sub-sample 50-99.9% are significantly positive and negative,
respectively, pointing to responsiveness of cash redistribution to investment op-
portunities within the group. The 100% ownership sub-sample exhibits the “best”
results concerning ICMs. For this sub-sample of wholly owned subsidiaries, the
parent cash flow coefficient is sizeable (0.11) and highly significant (t = 9.78),
and Tobin’s Q is negative and significant.
In sum, our results are consistent with agency theory, in that the efficiency of
the ICM crucially depends on the incentives and the control means of the parent.
The larger its interest in the subsidiary, the tighter the ICM and the better it
functions. This implies that proper functioning ICMs are costly, in the sense that
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the parent must have a sizeable stake in the subsidiary. We obtain the “best”
(with respect to ICMs) results in the wholly owned subsidiary sub-group.
We now turn to country effects on the workings of ICMs. We conduct three
tests for the effects of the quality of country institutions on the workings of ICMs.
First, we use the overall World Bank Index of country governance constructed by
Kaufmann et al. (2005). Second, we analyze the effects of legal systems. Finally,
we group firms according to geographical criteria.
4.3 Quality of country governance and internal capital
markets
Table 5 uses the average WGI index of the World Bank to differentiate among
four sub-samples, namely: (1) quality of both parent and subsidiary country gov-
ernance and financial system is “strong”, (2) quality of parent governance and
financial system is “strong” and of subsidiary financial system “weak”, (3) quality
of parent governance and financial system is “weak” and of subsidiary governance
and financial system “strong”, and (4) quality of both parent and subsidiary gov-
ernance and financial system is “weak”. Countries are separated on the basis of
whether the WGI index is larger or smaller than one.
Hypothesis 2 states that ICMs are most relevant in case (2), where the par-
ent financial system is strong, thus the parent should be able to fund profitable
investments and exert monitoring, but where the subsidiary system is weak, thus
the subsidiary needs an ICM because of a lack of good ECMs. We indeed get
the strongest results in the (2) sub-sample “strong/weak” in so far as the parent
cash flow coefficient is positive, large (0.21), and significant, and parent Tobin’s
Q is negative and significant. In the cases where the parent firm stems from a
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weak system (“weak/weak” and “weak/strong”), the functioning and effectiveness
of ICMs break down, as evidenced by much smaller and/or insignificant parent
cash flow coefficients, positive parent q coefficients, and large positive own (i.e.
subsidiary) cash flow coefficients.
In sum, crucial for the functioning of ICMs appears to be the country gover-
nance of the parent. A parent from a ”strong” country can via its ICM covering
a subsidiary from a “weak” country substitute for missing efficient institutions.
4.4 Legal systems and internal capital markets
Table 6 presents the results classifying parents and subsidiaries according to coun-
try legal systems. LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) conjecture that the Anglo-Saxon
and Scandinavian legal systems perform better than the Germanic and French le-
gal systems in a number of dimensions that affect capital market development. It
follows that the former have deeper external capital markets.14 We test Hypoth-
esis 3 regrouping firms into “strong legal system” firms including firms from the
Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legal systems (AS), and “weak legal system” firms
including firms from the Germanic and French legal systems (GF), (the latter cat-
egory includes also all transition countries). As can be seen, the results using the
legal systems splits are not so clear cut as the results using the WGI index. The
best functioning ICMs are found in the group GF/GF, i.e. for the sub-sample
of firms where the parent and the subsidiary stem from a “weak legal system”
country. For this group of firms, the parent cash flow coefficient is largest, and
it is the only group where parent Tobin’s Q is significantly negative. Of course,
14This fact is also valid in our data e.g. the average stock market to GDP ratio of Anglo-
Saxon and Scandinavian subsidiary countries is twice as large as for Germanic and French
subsidiary countries (125% versus 61%), and the private credit to GDP ratio is 30% higher
(132% versus 100%).
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many German (e.g. Siemens AG) and other Continental European parents are in
this sub-category, and they appear to know how to organize ICMs. We also ex-
perimented with other measures of country institutional development, especially
financial development, such as the market capitalization to GDP ratio and the
external debt to GDP ratio. Results are consistent with the results obtained with
WGI, that is, ICMs substitute for not well functioning ECMs.15
4.5 Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the USA
Table 7 presents our results on geographical country groups. We test Hypothesis
4 that subsidiaries in Eastern Europe (the parents of which stem from Western
countries in most cases) are more dependent on ICMs, since they lack well devel-
oped ECMs in their home countries. The evidence corroborates this hypothesis.
While the parent cash flow coefficient is only 0.075 for non-Eastern European
subsidiaries, this coefficient rises to 0.34 for Eastern European subsidiaries. The
difference is significant at the 1% level. The negative effect of parent Tobin’s Q
is also stronger, albeit not significantly so. Thus, this is compelling evidence that
ICMs substitute for missing or inefficient ECMs in Eastern Europe. The sec-
ond specification in Table 7 additionally interacts our variables of interest with a
US-subsidiary dummy. As becomes evident, US subsidiaries do not utilize ICMs.
This is not surprising given the fact that ECMs are well developed in the US.16
15These results are available upon request.
16In regressions not reported, we show that our results do not depend on the industry re-
latedness of parent and subsidiary. Coefficients are similar for horizontal versus non-horizontal
parent-subsidiary pairs. These results are available upon request.
21
4.6 Listed and unlisted subsidiaries
Hypothesis 5 states that ICMs are more relevant in unlisted than in listed sub-
sidiaries. The third column of Table 7 presents the results of a regression including
interaction terms of the variables of interest with a listed firm dummy. As pre-
dicted, ICMs are much more important for non-listed subsidiaries than for listed
subsidiaries: while the Tobin’s Q effect is not significantly different for the two
types of subsidiaries, the coefficient on parent cash flow is significantly positive
and significantly larger for non-listed subsidiaries than for listed subsidiaries, for
which the coefficient is near zero. The coefficient on own cash flow of listed sub-
sidiaries is nearly twice as large as that for non-listed subsidiaries (0.26 versus
0.15).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we test several hypotheses about the inner workings of internal
capital markets. We show that parent firms are involved in cash flow re-allocation
activities and that subsidiaries with better investment opportunities get a larger
share of the pie. We find (1) compelling evidence for the hypothesis that the
tightness of control of the parent firm in the subsidiary plays a crucial role for
the smooth functioning of ICMs. The larger the ownership stake of the parent,
the better the functioning of the ICM. However, the ownership stake of the parent
must be quite substantial for ICMs to work properly. We obtain the best results
for wholly owned subsidiaries. The study further reveals that (2) the country
institutional environment matters. Using World Bank indicators for country
governance, the best functioning ICMs can be found in the sub-sample of firms
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with parents from a country with high institutional development and subsidiaries
from a country with a low level of institutional development. (3) Consistently,
we find that subsidiaries in Eastern Europe are more dependent on ICMs than
subsidiaries elsewhere, that US subsidiaries do not use ICMs, and that unlisted
subsidiaries make much more use of ICMs than listed subsidiaries. Apparently
better access to external capital markets diminishes the importance of internal
capital markets for listed subsidiaries.
This paper sheds some light on the discussion on whether ICMs are bright or
dark. Our answer is it depends. ICMs are not a priori good or bad, their proper
functioning depends on the internal control structure of the parent-subsidiary
relation and on the external constraints the two types of firms face.
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Figure 1: Cash Constraints and Managerial Discretion
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Figure 1 shows the different investment decisions with unconstrained, constrained
access to capital markets and in presence of managerial discretion.
Variable Description:
r is the risk-adjusted market rate of interest
S is the unconstrained supply of capital
D is the demand for capital investment
I∗ is the investment under S (unconstrained)
Two different cash-flow situations: CFa is lower than CFb
S(CFa) is the constrained supply given cash-flow CFa
Ia is the investment under S(CFa) (constrained)
S(CFb) is the constrained supply given cash-flow CFb
Ib is the investment under S(CFb) (constrained)
CFm is lower than CFm′
MUI is the manager’s indirect marginal utility of investment schedule at cash-flow CFm
MDI is the manager’s indirect marginal disutility of investment schedule
Im is the investment under managerial discretion with cash-flow CFm
MD
I
′ is the managers indirect marginal disutility of investment schedule at cash-flow CF
m
′
I
m
′ is the investment under managerial discretion with cash-flow CF
m
′
Figure 2: Equalization of risk-adjusted returns in an efficient ICM
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Figure 2 shows the workings of an ICM between a subsidiary (left part) and a parent (right part).
Variable Description:
r is the risk-adjusted market rate of interest
DS is the subsidiary demand for capital investment
DP is the parent demand for capital investment
SS(CFa) is the constrained subsidiary’s supply given cash-flow CF
S
a
IS
∗
is the unconstrained subsidiary investment under S
ISa is the subsidiary investment under SS(CFa) (constrained)
ISaICM is the subsidiary investment under SS(CFa) (constrained but with ICM)
SP (CFa) is the parent market supply given cash-flow CF
P
a
IP
∗
is the unconstrained parent investment under S
IPa is the parent investment under SP (CFa) (no ICM)
IPaICM is the parent investment under SP (CFa) (with ICM)
Figure 3: The effects of an increase in parent cash flow in an efficient ICM
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Figure 3 shows the effects of an increase in parent cash-flow, shifting the parent cost of funds schedule to the right.
Variable Description:
r is the risk-adjusted market rate of interest
DS is the subsidiary demand for capital investment
DP is the parent demand for capital investment
SS(CFa) is the constrained subsidiary supply given cash-flow CF
S
a
ISaICM is the subsidiary investment under SS(CFa) (constrained but with ICM)
ISbICM is the subsidiary investment if parents cash flow increases
Two different cash-flow situations for the parent: CFPa is lower than CF
P
b
SP (CFa) is the parent market supply given cash-flow CF
P
a
IPaICM is the parent investment under SP (CFa) (with ICM)
SP (CFb) is the parent market supply given cash-flow CF
P
b
IPbICM is the parent investment under SP (CFb) (with ICM)
Figure 4: The effects of an increase in parent investment opportunities in an efficient ICM
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Figure 4 shows the effects of an increase in parent investment opportunities, shifting the demand for capital to the right.
Variable Description:
r is the risk-adjusted market rate of interest
DS is the subsidiary demand for capital investment
SS(CFa) is the constrained subsidiary supply given cash-flow CF
S
a
I1SaICM is the subsidiary investment if parent has lower investment opportunities
I2SaICM is the subsidiary investment if parent has higher investment opportunities
A change in investment opportunities for the parent: D1P is below D
2
P
D1P is the parent demand for capital investment with lower investment opportunities
D2P is the parent demand for capital investment with higher investment opportunities
SP (CFa) is the parent supply given cash-flow CF
P
a
I1PaICM is the parent investment with lower investment opportunities
I2PaICM is the parent investment with higher investment opportunities
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Country
Average
Legal Nb of Unlisted Nb of Listed Nb of Worldwide
System Country Subsidiaries Subsidiaries Parents Governance
Indicator
Anglo-Saxon
Australia 422 83 93 1.5920
Canada 2,467 12 415 1.6392
Hong Kong 25 95 49 1.0941
Ireland 150 35 31 1.5280
India 115 19 40 -0.1917
Malaysia 27 305 81 0.3897
Singapore 317 36 116 1.5466
South Africa 138 75 77 0.3365
United Kingdom 4,594 831 852 1.5793
United States 12,892 3,401 3,109 1.4173
Total 21,093 4,997 4,893 0.7447
Scandinavian
Denmark 327 60 68 1.7659
Finland 321 84 69 1.8553
Island 3 18 15 1.7265
Norway 223 93 74 1.7072
Sweden 667 174 145 1.7270
Total 1,541 429 371 1.7564
German
Austria 311 49 52 1.6166
Germany 2,396 308 343 1.5382
Japan 640 1,749 477 1.0882
Korea 617 170 324 0.5620
Switzerland 569 144 166 1.7908
Taiwan 497 24 281 0.8624
Total 5,074 2,463 1,666 1.2804
French
Argentina 257 0 15 -0.1294
Belgium 560 66 82 1.3741
Brazil 657 3 49 -0.0163
Chile 104 12 23 1.1098
France 2,613 307 371 1.2026
Greece 198 69 87 0.7502
Italy 1,140 171 165 0.7871
Mexico 1,067 36 73 -0.0519
Netherlands 981 106 127 1.7527
Portugal 138 75 77 1.2081
Spain 1,101 98 102 1.1846
Turkey 10 23 9 -0.2030
Total 9,243 1,121 1,274 0.2843
Transition
Bulgaria 29 1 3 0.1254
Croatia 62 7 14 0.1542
Czech Republic 263 14 9 0.7735
Estonia 52 10 7 0.8935
Hungary 58 12 11 0.8922
Latvia 25 8 2 0.5447
Lithuania 26 6 5 0.6131
Poland 509 24 40 0.6202
Romania 131 1 4 -0.0267
Russia 128 20 29 -0.6707
Serbia&Montenegro 11 4 0 -0.8395
Slovenia 24 3 5 0.9258
Slovakia 45 5 3 0.5532
Total 1,387 115 132 0.2349
Rest Total 808 542 299 -0.0404
All Total 39,346 9,699 8,677 0.4411
Anglo-Saxon further includes:Barbados,Bermuda,Hong Kong,Jamaica,M&V Isl.,Kenia,New Zealand,Pakistan;
German further includes: Antilles,Liechtenstein,Luxembourg;
French further includes: Colombia,Ecuador,Egypt,Lebanon,Jordan,Indonesia,Peru,Philippines,Venezuela ;
Rest: East-and West-African, Asian and Arab Countries not included in other categories;
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Type
Summary of main financial and ownership variables characterizing subsidiary
and parent firms - distinguishing between listed and unlisted subsidiaries.
Sample Period 1988-2005
(1) (2) (3)
Listed Unlisted Listed
Subsidiaries Subsidiaries Parents
Investment
Mean 0.073 0.063 0.087
Median 0.064 0.043 0.076
Cash flow
Mean 0.083 0.080 0.073
Median 0.081 0.075 0.075
Sales growth
Mean 0.150 0.150 0.120
Median 0.090 0.080 0.080
Tobin’s Q
Mean 1.44 1.63
Median 1.14 1.25
Nb of employees
Mean 6,389 975 50,540
Median 1,751 271 17,367
Parent’s Ownership %
Mean 66.74 93.87
Median 60.81 100
Nb of firms 608 8,410 2,048
Note:
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included;
Table 3: Main Results
Comparison of OLS, GMM and Heckman Estimates for equation (1) to adress
issues of endogeneity and selection bias. Sample Period 1988-2005.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS GMM Heckman
Dependent Variable: Subsidiary Investment
Sub: Investment lagged -0.0174
(0.009)
Sub: Sales Growth 0.0558* 0.0565* 0.0562*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Par: Sales Growth 0.0134* 0.0170* 0.0128*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Par: Tobin’s Q -0.0022* -0.0007 -0.0022*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Sub: Cash flow 0.1518* 0.0339* 0.1558*
(0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
Par: Cash flow 0.0965* 0.0490* 0.0937*
(0.011) (0.025) (0.010)
Constant 0.1574* 0.0354* 0.1576
(0.080) (0.004) (0.080)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio -0.0062*
(0.0016)
R-squared adj. 0.121
Wald chi2(15) 4921.06
Wald chi2(8) 1391.42
Nb of subsidiary firms 9,018 4,295 8,861
Nb of parent firms 2,048 1,246 2,011
Nb of obs 34,937 16,347 34,762
Note:
The estimation method in column (2) is one-step GMM; This method eliminates firm fixed
effects by first differencing; Instruments include lagged levels of the dependent and the
predetermined variables dated t-2 or earlier; instruments begin with InvestmentSub,t−2,
Sales GrowthSub,t−2, Sales GrowthSub,t−3, Sales GrowthPar,t−2, Sales GrowthPar,t−3, etc.
First stage Probit for column (3)
The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is a subsidiary, 0 if a stand alone firm;
Total Assets Sales Growth Profit/Total Assets Eastern Europe Western Europe
0.000* -0.076* 2.034* 3.502* 3.617*
(0.000) (0.022) (0.081) (0.053) (0.021)
Correlation coefficient rho = -0.055;
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included;
Sub: refers to the corresponding variable of the subsidiary firm;
Par: refers to the corresponding variable of the parent firm;
Nb. of observations and firms vary because:
(1) we include only firms with more than 4 observations in column (2)
(2) we include only firms with observable first stage in column (3)
Table 4: Regression Results: Ownership Concentration
OLS Estimates of equation (1) including interaction terms for parent ownership in column (1),
and including interaction terms for varying degrees of corporate control in column (2).
Sample Period 1988-2005
(1) (2)
Interactions with Interactions with
Ownership Percentage of Parent Range Dummies
Dependent Variable: Subsidiary Investment
Sub: Sales Growth 0.0666* 0.0666*
(0.001) (0.001)
Par: Sales Growth 0.0193* 0.0191*
(0.002) (0.002)
Par: Tobin’s Q 0.0038* -0.0039*
(0.001) (0.001)
Par: Tobin’s Q * Perct -0.0001*
(0.000)
Sub: Cash flow 0.2748* 0.1524*
(0.012) (0.007)
Sub: Cash flow * Perct -0.0013*
(0.000)
Par: Cash flow -0.0160 0.1086*
(0.015) (0.013)
Par: Cash flow * Perct 0.0012*
(0.000)
Par: Tobin’s Q * Perct0050 0.0075*
(0.001)
Par: Tobin’s Q * Perct5099 0.0028*
(0.001)
Sub: Cash flow * Perct0050 0.1134*
(0.013)
Sub: Cash flow * Perct5099 0.0089
(0.012)
Par: Cash flow * Perct0050 -0.0991*
(0.018)
Par: Cash flow * Perct5099 -0.0462*
(0.022)
Constant 0.1547 0.1543
(0.081) (0.081)
R-squared adj. 0.125 0.126
Nb of subsidiary firms 11,474 11,474
Nb of parent firms 2,541 2,541
Nb of obs 44,755 44,755
* p< 0.05
Note:
Standard errors in parentheses;
All subsidiaries are included (also those, that have parents with an ownership percentage < 50%);
Sub: refers to the corresponding variable of the subsidiary firm;
Par: refers to the corresponding variable of the parent firm;
Perct: denotes the ownership stake of the parent in the subsidiary;
Perct0050: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if “Perct” < 50%, 0 else;
Perct5099: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 50% ≥ Perct < 100%, 0 else;
The base category in column (2) are 100%-owned subsidiaries;
Table 5: Regression Results: Country Governance
OLS Estimates of equation (1) including interaction terms to distinguish the quality of
governance institutions of parent and subsidiary. Sample Period 1988-2005.
Dependent Variable: Subsidiary Investment
Sub: Sales Growth 0.0553*
(0.002)
Par: Sales Growth 0.0133*
(0.002)
Constant 0.0479*
(0.022)
Interaction Country’s WGI
Parent’s Country WGI strong/ strong/ weak/ weak/
Subsidiary’s Country WGI weak strong weak strong
Par: Tobin’s Q -0.0064* -0.0016* 0.0002 0.0019
(0.001) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.006)
Sub: Cash flow 0.1866* 0.1405* 0.2336* 0.177*
(0.014) (0.0063) (0.0257) (0.0501)
Par: Cash flow 0.2185* 0.0730* 0.109* 0.0763
(0.028) (0.0122) (0.0408) (0.0787)
R-squared adj. 0.123
Nb of subsidiary firms 8,994
Nb of parent firms 2,033
Nb of obs 34,852
* p< 0.05
Note:
Standard errors in parentheses;
WGI Worldwide Governance Indicator;
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included;
Sub: refers to the corresponding variable of the subsidiary firm;
Par: refers to the corresponding variable of the parent firm;
Country is “strong” if the country’s WGI > 1;
Country is “weak” if the country’s WGI ≤ 1;
Strong/weak: parent is from “strong” country, subsidiary from “weak” country;
Strong/strong: parent is from “strong” country, subsidiary from “strong” country;
Weak/weak: parent is from “weak” country, subsidiary from “weak” country;
Weak/strong: parent is from “weak” country, subsidiary from “strong” country;
Table 6: Regression Results: Country Legal System
OLS Estimates of equation (1) including interaction terms to distinguish the origin of legal systems
for parent and subsidiary firms. Sample Period 1988-2005.
Dependent Variable: Subsidiary Investment
Sub: Sales Growth 0.0557*
(0.002)
Par: Sales Growth 0.0135*
(0.002)
Constant 0.1574*
(0.080)
Interaction Country’s Legal System
Parent Legal System anglo-scand/ anglo-scand/ german-french/ german-french/
Subsidiary Legal System german-french anglo-scand german-french anglo-scand
Par: Tobin’s Q -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0035* -0.0061
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Sub: Cash flow 0.1538* 0.0864* 0.1732* 0.1461*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.030)
Par: Cash flow 0.0827* 0.0412 0.1257* -0.0136
(0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.0689)
R-squared adj. 0.123
Nb of subsidiary firms 8,999
Nb of parent firms 2,046
Nb of obs 34,876
* p< 0.05
Note:
Standard errors in parentheses;
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included;
Sub: refers to the corresponding variable of the subsidiary firm;
Par: refers to the corresponding variable of the parent firm;
Country is “anglo-scand” if it’s legal system is of Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian origin;
Country is “german-french” if it’s legal system is of German, French or Transition Country origin;
Anglo-scand/german-french: parent “anglo-scand” legal system, subsidiary “german-french” legal system;
Anglo-scand/anglo-scand: parent “anglo-scand” legal system, subsidiary “anglo-scand” legal system;
German-french/german-french: parent “german-french” legal system, subsidiary “german-french” legal system;
German-french/anglo-scand: parent “german-french” legal system, subsidiary “anglo-scand” legal system;
Table 7: Regression Results: Geography & Stock Exchange Listing
OLS Estimates of equation (1) including interaction terms to distinguish subsidiary location
in Eastern Europe (EE), (2) EE and the USA and (3) subsidiaries being listed on the stock exchange.
Sample Period 1988-2005.
(1) (2) (3)
EE USA and EE Listed
Dependent Variable: Subsidiary Investment
Sub: Sales Growth 0.0547* 0.0547* 0.0558*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Par: Sales Growth 0.0137* 0.0138* 0.0134*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Par: Tobin’s Q -0.0020* -0.0021* -0.0023*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Par-Sub: Par’s Q * EE -0.0015 -0.0013
(0.002) (0.002)
Sub: Cash flow 0.1489* 0.1473* 0.1453*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Par-Sub: Sub’s CF * EE 0.0158 0.0174
(0.017) (0.017)
Par: Cash flow 0.0746* 0.0780* 0.1073*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Par-Sub: Par’s CF * EE 0.2632* 0.2600*
(0.040) (0.040)
Par-Sub: Par’s Q * USA 0.0103
(0.006)
Par-Sub: Sub’s CF * USA 0.2105*
(0.068)
Par-Sub: Par’s CF * USA -0.2936*
(0.129)
Par: Par’s Q * listed 0.0002
(0.002)
Sub: Sub’s CF * listed 0.1141*
(0.023)
Par: Par’s CF * listed -0.0961*
(0.036)
Constant 0.1602* 0.1601* 0.1569*
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
R-squared adj. 0.124 0.125 0.122
Nb of subsidiary firms 9,018 9,018 9,018
Nb of parent firms 2,048 2,048 2,048
Nb of obs 34,937 34,937 34,937
* p< 0.05
Note:
Standard errors in parentheses;
Subsidiaries with ownership percentage of ≥ 50 % are included
Sub: refers to the corresponding variable of the subsidiary firm;
Par: refers to the corresponding variable of the parent firm;
Par-Sub: refers to the corresponding variable of the parent-subsidiary pair (interaction terms);
“EE” is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the subsidiary is located in Eastern Europe
“USA” is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the subsidiary is located in the USA;
The base category are subsidiaries not located in Eastern Europe or in the USA;
“Listed” is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the subsidiary is listed on a stock exchange, 0 otherwise;
The base category are subsidiaries not listed on a stock exchange;
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I Introduction
A great deal of interest has been devoted in recent years to the role of institutions in
determining both company and country performance. The inspiration for this research
can be traced back to the work of North (1990) illustrating the importance of institu-
tional quality as a determinant of long-run economic growth in Western countries, and
one segment of the literature focuses on the relationship between institutional factors
and country growth rates.1 Other parts examine the relationships between institutional
quality and various measures of company performance. Our article adds to this strand
of the literature. Because we focus on the performance of subsidiaries, our article is
also related to work on the effects of decentralization within firms, the creation of do-
mestic and foreign subsidiaries, and more generally to the literature on foreign direct
investment (FDI).
Although there is considerable agreement that good institutions lead to good per-
formance, there is disagreement over how good institutions should be defined, or put
differently, authors differ as to which institutions are important for determining per-
formance. One set of studies argues that it is the quality of a country’s governmental
institutions that is important. Companies perform better in countries with strong prop-
erty rights enforcement, independent judiciaries, strong contract enforcement, and the
like.2 Another set of studies, precipitated by the work of LaPorta et al. (1997, 1999,
2000) (hereafter, LLSV), emphasizes the importance of a country’s legal institutions -
whether it has a common law or a civil law system - in protecting shareholders and thus
reducing agency problems and improving company performance. These hypotheses are
not mutually inconsistent, of course. Common law systems may offer both greater
shareholder protection and better enforcement of property rights. Indeed, Mahoney
(2001) has made just such a claim. In this article, we test the relative explanatory
1See, Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997).
2See, for example, Besley (1995) and Johnson et al. (2002).
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power of both types of institutions. The existing literature tests for the importance of
institutions by relating differences in company performance across countries to differ-
ences in institutional structures. Thus, company A in country X is expected to perform
worse by some criterion than company B in country Y, if Y’s institutions are better
than X’s. The overwhelming conclusion of the literature is that ‘institutions matter’,
and good institutions do improve companies’ performances. In this paper, we examine
the effects of the institutional environment on the performance of subsidiaries - com-
panies for which some other company has an ownership stake of fifty percent or more.
Our objective is to see whether institutional quality also affects the performance of
subsidiaries, and in particular, when the subsidiary is in a different country, whether it
is the institutional quality in the parent firm’s country that affects the performance of
a subsidiary, the institutional quality in the subsidiary’s country that is important, or
both. One might hypothesize, for example, that a company located in a country with a
strong institutional environment will perform well not only in its own country, but that
it will also transfer this good performance to its subsidiaries, even when they are lo-
cated in countries with weak institutional environments. Alternatively, one might posit
that a subsidiary in a country with weak institutions performs like other companies in
this country, even if its parent is located in a country with strong institutions. Finally,
good performance might be observed only when both a parent and its subsidiary are
located in countries with strong institutions. In addition to testing these hypotheses,
we are interested in identifying the institutions that have the greatest impact on per-
formance.
To investigate the determinants of subsidiaries’ performance, we have constructed
a unique data set of more than 23,000 listed and unlisted subsidiaries worldwide over
the period 1994-2005. We identify the country of both a subsidiary and its parent,
and examine the effects on subsidiary performance of the institutional quality in the
countries of both the parent and its subsidiary. Because the sample includes both listed
and unlisted companies, it is not possible to use performance measures, like marginal
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and average Q’s, that require stock market data. We thus are limited to accounting
data, and use profits over total assets to measure subsidiary performance.
The FDI literature, especially for developing and transition countries, focuses on
performance differences between domestically-owned and foreign-owned firms, and usu-
ally treats the foreign firms as a homogenous group.3 The samples used in these studies
typically include detailed information on the foreign subsidiaries, but not on their par-
ents. Our study thus adds to the literature by examining the effects of institutional
quality in both the parents’ and subsidiaries’ countries. Our article also contributes to
the debate in the literature on the effects of government policies for attracting FDI by
identifying which governmental institutions have the greatest impact on performance.
While most studies use aggregate indexes of institutional quality, we separate the ef-
fects of legal institutions and various aspects of country governance on the performance
of domestic and foreign subsidiaries.
If good institutions lead to higher profits, then one might expect all companies
engaging in FDI to locate subsidiaries in countries with good institutions. But com-
petition in these countries for customers, for natural resources, for workers, etc. might
then drive down profits making a country with weaker institutions more attractive. To
the extent that weak institutions lead to greater risk, subsidiaries in countries with
weak institutions might actually exhibit higher average profitability along with greater
risk. Thus, a simple generalization from where companies choose to locate subsidiaries
and the profits they earn is not possible.
Briefly, we find that the quality of the institutions in both the parent’s and the
subsidiary’s countries has a positive impact on subsidiary profits, but that the institu-
tions in the parent country tend to be more important. In the next section, we turn
to a more explicit statement of the hypotheses tested. Section III describes data and
methodology. Section IV discusses basic results. The last section outlines the main
3See, for example, a survey of privatization studies on developed, developing and transition
countries Meggison and Netter (2001) and a survey of enterprize restructuring in transition
countries Djankov and Murrel (2002).
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conclusions.
II Hypotheses
Companies with high profits typically have some asset or set of assets that account
for these profits - a patent, brand image, organizational structure. It is reasonable
to expect that a subsidiary of a company benefits from the possession of such assets
as does the parent. FDI, for example, may occur to exploit in a foreign market, a
competitive advantage a company has in a domestic market. Recent theoretical work
concludes that more productive firms will choose FDI over exports into foreign markets
Helpman et al. (2004). Many researchers use John Dunning’s three conditions for a
firm to undertake FDI: ownership, location, and internalization (also known as the OLI
framework).4 Ownership advantages of multinational enterprizes (MNEs) are created
by their firm-specific, proprietary or knowledge-based assets. Location advantages con-
sist of profitable investment opportunities in foreign countries based on factors such as
tariffs, quotas, transport costs, low factor prices, and access to customers. Internaliza-
tion advantages arise when production in dispersed plants under common ownership
generates lower costs than production organized at arm’s length through markets.5
Both the O and the I of the OLI approach imply a positive association between a
parent’s and a subsidiary’s profits. We thus put forward
Hypothesis 1. A subsidiary’s profits are positively related to the profits of its parents.
Numerous studies have established a relationship between the quality of a coun-
try’s political and economic institutions and its growth rate.6 Institutions, which reduce
corruption, can, for example, lead to greater trust in a country and thereby to faster
4See Dunning (2000) and Dunning and Lundan (2008). See, also, the survey by Caves
(1996).
5Markusen (1995) presents six arguments why foreign direct investment occurs instead of
licensing.
6See Knack and Keefer (1995), Knack (1996), DeHaan and Siermann (1998), Wu and Davis
(1999) and the survey by DeHaan et al. (2006).
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growth.7 As a broad proxy for country institutional quality, several studies have used
indicators computed by Kaufmann et al. (2007) as part of the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) project.8 Drawing on the data sources provided by the institutions
mentioned in footnote 8, Kaufmann et al. (2007) estimate six different dimensions of
institutional quality: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law,
regulatory quality, absence of corruption and political stability.9 Our investigation of
the individual effects of these institutions, reported below, reveals that subsidiary per-
formance is not positively related to the WGI measure of political stability. We thus
construct an aggregate index of institutional quality by averaging the remaining five
WGI indicators, however, results are nearly identical if we use all six indexes. High
quality governance institutions in a country should increase company profitability by
reducing the transaction costs of writing and enforcing contracts, of obtaining licenses
and permits, and more generally of conforming to the laws and regulations of the coun-
try. We thus expect
Hypothesis 2. A subsidiary’s profits are higher in a country with high quality gover-
nance indicators.
By the same logic, we expect a parent’s profits to be higher if it operates in a coun-
try with high quality governance indicators. It may also be the case, however, that
some of the benefits a parent company obtains from operating in a country with high
quality institutions are passed on to its subsidiaries raising their profits. For example,
good institutions in a parent’s county may lower the transaction costs of writing and
enforcing contracts with its subsidiaries. The internal capital markets that characterize
multi-plant companies may function better, if the parent operates in a country with a
7See, Knack and Keefer (1997).
8Other measures of institutional quality have been constructed by Freedom House, the
Heritage Foundation, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), Gallup International,
and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled by the Political Risk Services
group. There is considerable overlap across these various indexes.
9By using the WGI measures researchers avoid having to choose among the different, but
highly correlated, variables provided by various institutions.
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good institutional environment. Cash constraints are then lower and more profitable
investment projects can be financed by the subsidiary using the internal capital mar-
ket.10 Good institutions in a parent’s country may also raise its subsidiary’s profits by
facilitating the transfer of technology and know how. Finally, good institutions in a
parent’s country may lead to better management practices, which can be transferred
to its subsidiaries. We thus put forward
Hypothesis 3. A subsidiary’s profits are higher if its parent is located in a country with
high quality governance indicators.
The WGI governance indicators used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 measure the qual-
ity of a country’s institutional environment as it impacts the external environment of
a firm - its transaction with other firms, with the state, and so on. The corporate
governance literature focuses on institutions that affect the internal environment of a
firm, most importantly the extent of agency problems.11 This literature has demon-
strated that there are significant differences in performance across firms related to (1)
the legal institutions of the country in which a company is located, (2) the identity
of the controllers of a firm, and (3) the degree of entrenchment of those in control.12
In particular, companies operating in countries with legal environments, which pro-
vide weak shareholder protection, have significantly worse investment performance and
payout less in dividends than companies in countries with legal environments offering
strong shareholder protection. The greater agency problems are, the larger the share
of potential profits that gets transformed into managerial rents of one form or another.
We thus predict higher profits in countries which offer owners strong legal protection
against managers. Hypothesis 4 postulates the same hierarchy in the quality of legal
institutions as put forward by LLSV. To their four categories of legal institutions we
10See, Gugler et al. (2010).
11See, LaPorta et al. (1997, 1999, 2000), Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000), Gugler et al. (2004a,b,
2008), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998). See for
developing and developed countries, Gugler et al. (2003), see for transition countries Mueller
and Peev (2007).
12See, LaPorta et al. (2000), Morck et al. (1998), Faccio et al. (2001).
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have added a fifth - transition countries. We expect the weakest legal protection for
owners in the countries, which have most recently taken up capitalist institutions.
Hypothesis 4. The highest subsidiary profits are reported in countries of Anglo-Saxon
origin with successively lower profits observed in countries with legal systems of Scan-
dinavian, German and French origin. The lowest subsidiary profits are expected in the
transition countries.
It seems reasonable to assume that if agency problems are not serious in a parent
firm that they will not be serious in its subsidiaries. Hypothesis 5. The highest profits
are reported for subsidiaries of parent companies located in countries of Anglo-Saxon
origin with successively lower profits observed for subsidiaries with parents in countries
with legal systems of Scandinavian, German and French origin. The lowest subsidiary
profits are expected in when a subsidiary’s parent is in a transition country.
III Data and Methodology
We construct a unique data set of parent firms as well as their listed and unlisted
subsidiaries. The data come from the Amadeus and Osiris databases.13 Each database
assigns a unique identification number to each company. Using this identification key, it
was possible to interlink the two databases. Amadeus contains ownership and financial
firm-level data for mainly unlisted companies from 38 European countries. The second
database, Osiris, contains ownership and financial firm-level data for publicly listed
companies for around 120 countries.
We link the ownership structure data provided by Osiris to the financial data for
unlisted subsidiaries from Amadeus to construct a panel covering the period 1994-2005
consisting of 4,135 parent firms and 23,241 subsidiaries, both foreign- and domestically-
owned. The average number of subsidiaries per parent firm is 6.
As noted above, we evaluate the quality of a country’s governance institutions
13Data are provided by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing.
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using five of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank: Voice
and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Effectiveness, Rule of Law,
and Control of Corruption. Each index is briefly defined in the appendix.
Following LLSV, country legal systems are classified into four major, legal-origins
categories: Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, German, and French. We also introduce a fifth
category, Transition, for post-communist transition economies. Although it would be
possible to try and trace the origins of transition countries’ legal systems back to one of
the other four categories, we think that each transition country’s long experience with
communism has probably sufficiently altered its legal institutions enough to warrant
separate treatment. Table 1 gives the number of subsidiaries in each category. Columns
identify the origin of a parent country, rows of a subsidiary. Thus, there are 318
subsidiaries in a German-origin country with a parent in an Anglo-Saxon country. The
upper in the diagonal entries is the number of domestic subsidiaries in the legal system
identified by the column or row, the entry below the line is the number of foreign
subsidiaries in the same legal system. Thus, in our sample, 4,882 subsidiaries in an
Anglo-Saxon country had a parent from the same Anglo-Saxon country (US parent and
US subsidiary, Canadian parent and subsidiary). Such companies are labeled domestic
subsidiaries throughout the article. At the same time, 2,029 subsidiaries in the Anglo-
Saxon countries had parents from a different Anglo-Saxon country (US parent with
a Canadian subsidiary). The Anglo-Saxon countries constitute the largest fraction
of subsidiaries, while transition countries had the smallest fractions in each category.
Nevertheless, over 13,000 subsidiaries come from non-Anglo-Saxon countries.
We measure company performance as after tax profits divided by total assets.
Profitability is the most relevant measure of performance for the owners of a company,
but is also the measure that is most easily manipulated by accountants and subject to
different country accounting conventions. Nevertheless, we think that this is the best
measure of performance that we can construct with the data available.
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for each variable used in the
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study. There is considerable variation in subsidiary profit rates with their standard
deviation being roughly double the mean.
IV Results
A Aggregate Results for Hypotheses 1-3
We first measure institutional quality as the average of the five WGI measures listed
above. Later we look at the results for each index. The WGI is published by country
and year, so we can test hypotheses 1-3 by running regressions with panel data for
1994-2005. The dependent variable is defined as profit to assets ratio of subsidiary s
in year t, pist. Hypothesis 1 is tested by using the profits of the parent of subsidiary
s as an explanatory variable, pispt. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested by including the
institutional quality indexes for the country of the parent, GIspt, and of the subsidiary,
GIst, as explanatory variables. To these we add as control variables the sizes of the
parent and subsidiary measured as the logs of their total assets, lnKspt and lnKst,
and the age of the parent, Aspt. This gives us the following basic equation.
piit = a+ bpispt + cGIspt + dGIst + elnKspt + flnKst + gAspt + µst (1)
For domestic subsidiaries GIspt and GIst are, of course the same. Thus, we estimate
two versions of (1), one for domestic subsidiaries with only GIst included, and one for
foreign subsidiaries with separate governance indexes for both parent and subsidiary
included.
Table 3 presents the results for the two regressions. Hypothesis 1 receives resounding
support. Each percentage point increase in a parent’s profit rate increases a domestic
subsidiary’s profit rate by 39 percent of a percentage point. The relationship between
a parent’s and a foreign subsidiary’s profits is not as strong, but nevertheless is also
highly significant. The stronger link between parent and subsidiary profits for domes-
tic subsidiaries suggests greater difficulty in transferring knowledge and other assets
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to subsidiaries in other countries. The coefficient on institutional quality for domestic
subsidiaries is positive and also highly significant. GI has a range of five. Its coeffi-
cient of 0.017 for domestic subsidiaries implies that an increase of only one point in
the index raises the return on assets by about 40 percent of their mean value. Both
coefficients on the GIs are significant in the foreign subsidiary equation. Together they
sum to roughly the same value as the coefficient in the domestic subsidiary equation.
The impact of the governance institutions in the parent’s country is much greater
than for the subsidiary’s country, however. The results for both equations in Table
3 offer strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Here it should also be noted that the
effects on subsidiary profits from strong institutional quality will be understated if
institutional quality also raises a parent’s profits, since the parent’s profits are also
included in the equation.
We also estimated the two equations in Table 3 using the lagged profits instead of
the current profits of the parent on the right-hand-side to remove the possibility of
parent’s profits being endogenous. The coefficient on lagged profits for domestic sub-
sidiaries fell from 0.38 to 0.32 (t = 42.16), while the coefficient on lagged profits for
foreign subsidiaries fell from 0.21 to 0.19 (t = 22.85). All other coefficients remained
substantially the same. Thus, our findings are robust to the use of current or lagged
parent profits as an explanatory variable. The same holds true for the extended ver-
sions of the model discussed below.
Three of the four size variables have negative coefficients, although one of these three
is insignificant. Having a relatively small parent raises the profits of domestic sub-
sidiaries, but lowers it for foreign subsidiaries. The latter result suggests the possibility
of some form of economy of scale when companies establish subsidiaries abroad. The
third control variable, the age of the parent company, has a positive and significant
coefficient for foreign subsidiaries.
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B Aggregate Results for Hypotheses 1-5
We now add dummy variables to equation (1) to capture the effects of legal institu-
tions on subsidiary profitability. One can, of course, expect some relationship between
the quality of a country’s governance institutions as measured by the GI and its legal
institutions. Transition countries have more corruption than Anglo-Saxon countries.
But the relationship is not one to one. Some countries with relatively weak protection
of shareholders, like Germany, score highly on the rule-of-law index.
Table 4 reports results for both domestic and foreign subsidiaries with the addition
of dummies for the legal institutions in the subsidiaries’ and parents’ countries. The
coefficients on the parent’s profitability are again both highly significant and very
close to their values in Table 3. Hypothesis 1 continues to receive strong support. In
the sample of foreign subsidiaries, the coefficient on the governance institutions in the
parent’s country preserves the same value and is significant. Controlling for the legal
institutions in the parent’s and subsidiary’s countries slightly weakens the relationship
between the GIs and profitability, however. Two of the three coefficients are smaller
in Table 4 than in Table 3, although still positive, and now only two are statistically
significant. The four size variables have the same pattern of coefficients as in Table
3, and the age of the parent firm is again only significant in the foreign subsidiary
equation. Both equations in Table 4 were estimated without intercepts so that the
country dummies in the domestic subsidiary equation can be interpreted as inter-
cepts for subsidiaries in the five legal-system categories. The pattern of coefficients
on these dummies conforms roughly to the predictions of the law and finance litera-
ture. Domestic subsidiaries in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legal-origin countries
are predicted to have a profit rate over 5 percent, with the rate in the Scandinavian
countries actually being somewhat the higher of the two. In the German and French
legal-origin countries the domestic subsidiaries’ profit rate is predicted to be a bit over
4 percent, and in the transition countries about 3 percent.
The equation for foreign subsidiaries has been estimated by constraining the coeffi-
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cients on the legal-system dummies for the subsidiaries’ countries to sum to zero.14
The coefficients on the dummies for the parents’ countries can now be interpreted
as country intercepts. To get the predicted profit rate for a subsidiary based on the
legal-systems in its own country and its parent’s, one adds the two coefficients. Thus,
a subsidiary in a Scandinavian country with a parent in an Anglo-Saxon company
is predicted to have a profit rate of 0.018 (0.005 + 0.013) taking account only the
legal origins of the two countries. The legal origins of the parents’ countries generally
have a greater impact on the profits of a subsidiary than the legal origins of its own
country. This is consistent with the assumption that legal systems, as categorized
by LLSV, protect shareholders. The ultimate owners of subsidiaries are the owners
of their parent companies. If they are located in countries, which provide strong
legal protection, both they and their parents tend to report higher profits. Never-
theless, subsidiaries in countries with Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legal systems
are expected to have profit rates significantly above the average, while subsidiaries in
countries with German- and French-origin legal systems are expected to have profit
rates significantly below the average. The coefficients on the transition dummies for
both parents and subsidiaries were insignificant. The one finding in Table 4 that
runs against Hypotheses 4 and 5 is that subsidiaries with parents in French-origin
countries are predicted to have as high a profitability as subsidiaries with parents in
Scandinavian countries and somewhat higher than subsidiaries with parents in Anglo-
Saxon countries. This anomaly aside, the results in Table 4 indicate that the origins
of the legal systems in parent and subsidiary countries do impact their profitability
in accordance with Hypotheses 4 and 5.
B Decomposing Institutional Quality
The index of institutional quality used above is an average of five different measures
of institutional quality. Some World Bank indexes of institutional quality, like ‘the
14The coefficients in Table 4 have been rounded, which explains why they do not exactly sum
to zero.
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rule of law’ measure an attribute of a country’s institutional structure. Others, like
‘political stability’ or ‘government effectiveness’ represent consequences of a country’s
institutional structure. It seems likely that these country characteristics might affect
the performance of companies differently. High corruption and the absence of the
rule of law should seriously handicap businesses, but political instability might leave
them unaffected. Italy had by most measures considerable political instability during
the last half of the 20th century, but its companies performed very well over most of
this period. It is worth examining, therefore, whether we get similar results for the
individual measures of institutional quality as we obtained for the aggregate measure.
As one might expect, the six World Bank indexes of institutional quality are highly
correlated with their average and with one another (see Table 5). Three of the in-
dexes have correlations with the average of around 0.95. The lowest correlation with
the average is for political stability (r = 0.73), and this index is also more weakly
correlated with the other indexes. We might, thus, expect somewhat different results
when we classify countries with this index, and this is what we observe.
In Table 6, we report the results for domestic subsidiaries when the aggregate index
used in Tables 3 and 4 is replaced sequentially with the six individual World Bank
indexes. Four of the six coefficients on the GIs are positive and significant with values
equal to or near the 0.006 coefficient reported in Table 4. The two insignificant GI
coefficients are for voice and accountability and political stability. This pattern is
sensible. The important governance institutions for subsidiary performance are those
that affect its economic environment - rule of law, corruption, etc. The political en-
vironment appears to be unimportant. Our decision to omit political stability when
constructing the aggregate index used in Tables 3 and 4 was based on its performance
in Tables 6 and 7. The coefficients on the other variables reported in Table 6 tell a
similar story to those reported for domestic subsidiaries in Table 4.
In Table 7, the two average GI indexes used in Table 4 for foreign subsidiaries are
replaced by the individual indexes. All six indexes have positive and significant coef-
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ficients for the countries of the parents of foreign subsidiaries, with the coefficient on
political stability being considerably smaller than for the other five indexes.
Only one GI index for the subsidiary’s country has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient - Control for Corruption. Even subsidiaries of companies in countries with good
institutions appear to suffer if they themselves are located in countries with high
corruption. The coefficients on the other five GI indexes are all insignificant for the
subsidiaries’ countries. Thus, the results for foreign subsidiaries reported in Table 7
reveal, as did those in Table 4, that the quality of institutions in a parent’s country
has a greater impact on a subsidiary’s profitability that the quality of institutions
in its own country. The remaining variables in Table 7 exhibit a similar pattern of
coefficients as in Table 4.
V Conclusion
A great deal of research has established that ‘institutions matter’ when it comes to
the performance of countries. Good institutions produce higher incomes per capita,
higher growth rates and other dimensions of social welfare. Companies in countries
with good institutional environments have higher returns on investment, pay out more
in dividends and exhibit other attributes of good performance. In this article, we have
tested to see whether good institutions also lead to better performance of subsidiaries
using two sets of definitions of good institutions.
Our results indicate that good institutions do lead to better performance for sub-
sidiaries. Both the quality of the parent country’s institutional environment, and that
of the country in which the subsidiary is located are positively related to the profitabil-
ity of a subsidiary. Of the two, it was the quality of institutions in the parent’s country,
which had the largest impact on the profitability of a subsidiary. This finding com-
bined with the large coefficients on the profitability of the parents in all of our models
indicates that profitable companies located in countries with strong institutional envi-
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ronments are able to transfer some of their advantages to their subsidiaries, domestic
or foreign.
We also found that the origins of the legal systems had significant effects. When
parent and subsidiary came from the same country, the highest profits were observed in
the countries with the best legal protections for shareholders - Anglo-Saxon and Scandi-
navian countries. Domestic subsidiaries’ profits were lowest in the transition countries,
with the profits of domestic subsidiaries in French and German-origin countries falling
in between these two extremes. With a couple of exceptions the same pattern was
observed for foreign subsidiaries’ performance. As was the case with the country gov-
ernance institutions, the legal origins of the parents’ countries generally have a greater
impact on the profits of a subsidiary than the legal origins of its own country. The em-
phasis placed on institutional quality by international agencies like the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund for improving economic performance seems well founded,
and in particular reducing corruption in both parent and subsidiary country can lead
to better performance. Moreover, the parent firm can transfer some of its intangible
asset advantages to its subsidiaries.
VI Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank
Various institutions (e.g. Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, the Business Envi-
ronment Risk Intelligence (BERI), Gallup International, the World Economic Forum,
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled by the Political Risk Services
group) construct measures of institutional quality. Drawing on the data sources pro-
vided by the institutions mentioned above and other sources, Kaufmann et al. (2007)
estimate six different dimensions of institutional quality: voice and accountability, gov-
ernment effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, absence of corruption and political
stability. The indicators are constructed using unobserved components methodology
and are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding
15
to better governance:
Voice and Accountability - measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence - measuring perceptions of the likelihood
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Government Effectiveness - measuring perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory Quality - measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formu-
late and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development.
Rule of Law - measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.
Control of Corruption - measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Subsidiaries Parents
Domestic Foreign
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Profit/Loss over Total Assets 0.040 0.08 0.037 0.08 0.044 0.05
Log of Total Assets 10.901 2.090 10.915 1.78 14.746 2.05
Age 62.4 57.1
Word Governance Index (GI) 1.537 0.36 1.480 0.43 1.550 0.33
Voice and Accountability 1.233 0.24 1.247 0.25 1.260 0.23
Rule of Law 1.562 0.37 1.480 0.45 1.587 0.33
Regulatory Quality 1.327 0.37 1.304 0.39 1.334 0.34
Control of Corruption 1.796 0.52 1.674 0.63 1.794 0.47
Governmental Efficiency 1.768 0.39 1.695 0.50 1.777 0.37
Political Stability 0.890 0.28 0.898 0.32 0.930 0.29
Note:
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included;
The 6 dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicator by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005):
Voice and Accountability: Citizens participation in governmental processes.
Political Stability: Likelihood of governmental destabilization by unconstitutional means.
Government Effectiveness: Quality of public services, policy implementation and commitments.
Regulatory Quality: Formulation of governmental regulations.
Rule of Law: Law and contract enforcement, likelihood of crime and violence, etc.
Control of Corruption: extend to which public power is exercised for private gain.
Table 3: Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3
Domestic Foreign
Subsidiaries Subsidiaries
GIP 0.013***
9.82
GIS 0.017*** 0.005***
14.86 5.09
(Log Total Assets)P -0.002*** 0.001**
-9.60 3.17
(Log Total Assets)S -0.000 -0.002***
-0.93 -8.04
AgeP -4.67e-06 1.55e-04*
-0.68 2.49
(Profit/Total Assets)P 0.386*** 0.210***
55.81 28.35
Constant 0.029*** 0.012**
8.51 2.65
R-squared 0.075 0.021
Nb. of obs. 48,504 50,727
Note:
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included.
Domestic: Subsidiary country is the same as the parent country.
Foreign: Subsidiary country is not the same as the parent country.
Subindex P refers to parent, subindex S to subsidiary.
Below the regression coefficient the t-value is reported.
Table 4: Tests of Hypotheses 1-5
Domestic Foreign
Subsidiaries Subsidiaries
GIP 0.013***
9.31
GIS 0.006** 0.001
2.96 0.87
(Log Total Assets)P -0.002*** 0.001***
-7.47 4.30
(Log Total Assets)S -0.001* -0.002***
-2.50 -7.74
AgeP 2.37e-06 6.34e-06*
0.34 2.27
(Profit/Total Assets)P 0.383*** 0.201***
55.07 26.72
Anglo-SaxonS 0.050*** 0.003**
11.14 3.12
ScandinavianS 0.054*** 0.005***
11.14 4.12
GermanS 0.042*** -0.004*
9.15 -2.55
FrenchS 0.040*** -0.004***
10.28 -6.30
TransitionS 0.032*** 0.000
7.62 0.25
Anglo-SaxonP 0.013**
2.78
ScandinavianP 0.016**
3.12
GermanP 0.007
1.35
FrenchP 0.017***
3.60
TransitionP 0.002
0.24
R-squared 0.075 0.024
Nb. of obs. 48,504 50,727
Note:
Subsidiaries with an ownership percentage of ≥ 50% are included.
Domestic: Subsidiary country is the same as the parent country.
Foreign: Subsidiary country is not the same as the parent country.
Subindex P refers to parent, subindex S to subsidiary.
Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, German, French and Transition refers to the legal origin.
Below the regression coefficient the t-value is reported.
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Table 6: Domestic Subsidiaries, Individual Components World Governance Index and
Legal Origin
Voice and Rule of Regulatory Control for Governmental Political
Accountability Law Quality Corruption Efficiency Stability
GIS 0.001 0.004* 0.005*** 0.006** 0.006*** -0.002
0.54 2.32 3.50 3.03 3.81 -1.03
(Log Total Assets)S -0.001** -0.001* -0.000* -0.001** -0.000* -0.001**
-2.75 -2.53 -2.34 -2.67 -2.37 -2.79
(Log Total Assets)P -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
-7.42 -7.53 -7.60 -7.21 -7.57 -7.45
AgeP 3.21e-06 2.46e-06 3.17e-06 1.88e-06 1.64e-06 3.313-06
0.46 0.35 0.27 0.46 0.24 0.47
(Profit/Total Assets)P 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.383***
55.07 55.10 55.09 54.99 55.07 55.03
Anglo-SaxonS 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.062***
14.60 11.84 11.83 10.86 10.82 18.26
ScandinavianS 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.067***
13.28 11.73 11.60 12.28 10.85 15.72
GermanS 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.054***
11.09 9.42 9.62 9.74 8.98 12.96
FrenchS 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.050***
11.81 10.73 11.27 11.06 9.65 14.47
TransitionS 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036***
7.66 8.07 8.27 7.25 7.61 8.68
R-squared 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
Nb. of obs. 48,504 48,504 48,504 48,504 48,504 48,504
The 6 dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicator by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) include the following:
Voice and Accountability: Citizens participation in governmental processes, freedom of association, free media, etc.
Political Stability: Likelihood of governmental destabilization by unconstitutional means, etc.
Government Effectiveness: Quality of public services, policy implementation and commitments, etc.
Regulatory Quality: Formulation of governmental regulations that promote private sector development.
Rule of Law: Law and contract enforcement, likelihood of crime and violence, etc.
Control of Corruption: extend to which public power is exercised for private gain.
Below the regression coefficient the t-value is reported.
Table 7: Foreign Subsidiaries, Individual Components World Governance Index and
Legal Origin
Voice and Rule of Regulatory Control for Governmental Political
Accountability Law Quality Corruption Efficiency Stability
GIS -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.006*** 0.001 -0.002
-0.60 -1.16 -0.00 4.72 1.19 -1.38
GIP 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.005**
6.79 8.66 10.41 7.39 9.91 2.81
(Log Total Assets)S -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
-7.76 -7.66 -7.62 -7.93 -7.80 -7.73
(Log Total Assets)P 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
3.96 3.99 4.25 4.41 4.50 3.93
AgeP 16.1e-04* 14.9e-04* 16.7e-04* 12.4e-04** 13.8e-04* 17.5e-04**
2.55 2.35 1.95 2.64 2.18 2.76
(Profit/Total Assets)P 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.208***
27.05 26.99 26.81 26.91 26.58 27.67
Anglo-SaxonS 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.003** 0.002*
3.40 3.77 3.55 0.46 3.09 2.55
ScandinavianS 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006***
5.00 5.03 4.17 3.99 4.06 5.45
GermanS -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.003*
-2.39 -2.10 -2.27 -2.92 -2.63 -2.26
FrenchS -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
-6.50 -6.68 -6.41 -5.18 -6.55 -6.43
TransitionS -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003* 0.001 -0.001
-0.61 -0.97 -0.30 1.99 0.44 -0.58
Anglo-SaxonP 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.012* 0.035***
4.94 3.34 3.48 3.07 2.52 8.28
ScandinavianP 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.015** 0.038***
5.10 3.63 3.38 4.08 2.95 7.99
GermanP 0.016*** 0.008 0.008 0.009* 0.005 0.026***
3.33 1.59 1.78 1.97 1.14 5.66
FrenchP 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.015** 0.036***
5.29 4.22 4.37 4.16 3.12 8.31
TransitionP 0.003 0.008 0.007 -0.004 0.001 0.009
0.44 0.98 0.88 -0.45 0.15 1.14
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.023
Nb. of obs. 50,727 50,727 50,727 50,727 50,727 50,727
The 6 dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicator by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) include the following:
Voice and Accountability: Citizens participation in governmental processes, freedom of association, free media, etc.
Political Stability: Likelihood of governmental destabilization by unconstitutional means, etc.
Government Effectiveness: Quality of public services, policy implementation and commitments, etc.
Regulatory Quality: Formulation of governmental regulations that promote private sector development.
Rule of Law: Law and contract enforcement, likelihood of crime and violence, etc.
Control of Corruption: extend to which public power is exercised for private gain.
Below the regression coefficient the t-value is reported.
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Abstract
Despite the economic importance of international foreign direct investment (FDI) flows,
it seems that investment decisions of multinational firms are not well understood. A multi-
national firm can either establish a subsidiary in a foreign country through greenfield in-
vestment or through acquiring an existing firm in the target country. The subsidiary can
either be wholly owned or jointly owned. How do those firms organize their international
production? Which investment mode serves best domestic/foreign markets? The goal
of this paper is to shed some light on the determinants of foreign market entry modes.
In particular to analyze the systematic variation in the mode choice of FDI, namely ac-
quisition versus non-acquisition (greenfield) investments. We propose a transparent and
general applicable method of data base construction. This database includes information
about parent firms and their subsidiaries (majority owned affiliates) in foreign countries.
A particular feature is the construction of a variable which indicates how the subsidiaries
were established, either by acquisition or not. This variable allows to differentiate the
establishment mode of parent firms into foreign markets. For this purpose two databases
from the Bureau van Dijk are interlinked: Osiris and Zephyr. We provide evidence that
firm heterogeneity is important for U.S. multinational firms in determining their entry
mode choice. However, this is not a distinguishing feature for European multinational
firms. For both sets of parents the host country characteristics play an important role
in deciding on the entry mode. Higher institutional quality increases the likelihood of
acquisitions versus greenfield investments
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1 Introduction
Despite the economic importance of international foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, it
seems that investment decisions of multinational firms are not well understood. A multina-
tional firm can either establish a subsidiary in a foreign country through greenfield investment
or through acquiring an existing firm in the target country. The subsidiary can either be
wholly owned or jointly owned. How do those firms organize their international production?
Which investment mode serves best domestic/foreign markets? What matters more the par-
ent firm characteristics or the characteristics of the target country to be entered? The goal of
this paper is to shed some light on the determinants of foreign market investment modes. In
particular to analyze the systematic variation in the mode choice of FDI, namely acquisition
versus non-acquisition (e.g. greenfield) investments. Such questions have been studied in the
international business literature and more recently in the international trade literature. We
seek to contribute to the literature in several ways.
First, we propose a transparent and general applicable method of data base construction.
This method can overcome the lack of data regarding the entry mode decision of multinational
corporations. We use existing empirical studies as a benchmark for the validity of our data
base.
Second, using this method we analyze the determinants of the mode of foreign market en-
try for a sample of U.S. and Western European parent firms. We are the first to report results
for so many countries of parent firms. Most studies in the international trade literature base
their empirical results on one U.S. data set. We show that results obtained for U.S. parent
firms do not necessarily carry over to European parent firms.
Summarizing the key results we find evidence, that profitable U.S. parents prefer green-
field investments as entry mode into foreign markets. We do not find significant variation
in the mode choice of Western European parent firm characteristics. Our results imply that
empirical evidence regarding the entry mode decision of U.S. parent firms do not necessarily
answer questions about the behavior of Western European parent firms. Valid for both sets
of parent firms is, that the higher the institutional quality of the subsidiary country, the more
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likely will parent firms choose to acquire the subsidiary rather than to undertake a greenfield
investment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the existing research
and relevant literature. Section 3 describes the tested hypotheses regarding the determinants
of entry mode. Section 4 and section 5 describe the data and estimation methodology. Section
6 shows the empirical results and section 7 concludes with a summary. In the appendix the
reader will find a critical and detailed description of the data base construction.
2 Literature Review
The literature on the effects of foreign direct investment on acquiring firms is quite large.
It compromises contributions from several fields of economic research such as i.e. the in-
ternational business literature, the international trade literature, the institutional economics
literature and the international organizations literature. We are most interested in the fol-
lowing questions: What explains best the behavior of multinational firms either setting up
subsidiaries by greenfield investment and/or acquisition investments? Can we observe differ-
ences in parents choosing one alternative over the other? We would like to take a look at
the literature from different angles and evaluate inspiring contributions from different lines of
research.
Markusen (1995) provides an overview of the determinants for multinational economic
activities. He describes six macro facts from the aggregate data and six micro facts from
industry and firm-level data regarding the activities of multinational firms.1 The underlying
determinants for a firm to enter foreign markets seem to depend on the nature of FDI either
being horizontal or vertical. Analysis of horizontal FDI roots its arguments mostly on the
1Macro facts: 1. FDI is growing rapidly around the world. 2. Developed countries are the performers and
recipients of FDI. 3. We observe large two-way FDI flows between developed countries. 4. Most FDI seems
to be horizontal. 5. 30% of trade is intra-firm trade. 6. There is little evidence that FDI is correlated with
differences in factor endowments across countries.
Micro facts: 1. FDI is hugely different across industries. 2. Multinational firms usually have a higher share of
R&D/Sales. 3. Multinational firms are tentatively firms with a high ratio of book to market value. 4. There is
little evidence that plant level scale economies are negatively correlated with multinationality. 5. There exists
a threshold size for multinational firms. 6. Mixed evidence is found to wether FDI is related to trade barriers
or transport costs.
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proximity-concentration trade off, where transport costs are larger than costs of establishing
of a foreign market presence. Arguments for vertical FDI usually compromise rent and market
power appropriation as main driving forces. Next to the cost minimization and market failure
arguments, the transfer of intangible firm-specific assets (e.g. corporate culture) and com-
parative advantages seem to be relevant for either type of FDI.2 A complementary question
to the determinants of multinational activity of firms needs to explain why multinationals
choose FDI instead of arm’s length licensing agreements with a foreign firm. Antras et al.
(2009) propose that in the presence of monitoring problems and financial frictions, firms en-
gage rather in FDI than in arm’s length technology transfers. An other important line of
discussion treats the question if the engagement of multinational firms in a foreign market is
a complement or a substitute to domestic economic activities. Paffermayer (2004) analyzes
the domestic growth performance of multinational firms with foreign affiliates in the Aus-
trian manufacturing sector. According to the author, firms in the possession of intangible
firm specific assets do not substitute their domestic economic activities with foreign economic
activities (export/affiliates). Desai et al. (2009) show that expansion of US firms abroad re-
sults in higher domestic investment and strengthen the hypothesis that domestic and foreign
economic activities are rather complements than substitutes. Only recently a small but con-
stantly growing literature is investigating the impact of different strategies to enter a foreign
market (FDI mode choices). The major drawback for empirical applications is the availability
of data sources. Usually the entry mode is not registered systematically in most countries an
exception is the mandatory survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the USA.3
The international business literature provides many empirical applications with differ-
ent methodologies e.g. focusing on individual industries, individual countries or on multi-
country/multi-industry studies. The studies vary quite substantially in data bases, sample
sizes and scope.4 This literature can broadly be divided into two streams. One is the for-
eign establishment mode literature, distinguishing between foreign market entry types such as
acquisition or greenfield investment. Second the management literature, which concentrates
2For horizontal FDI see Helpman et al. (2004). For vertical FDI see Hortacsu and Syverson (2009).
3Other examples are survey data for Sweden and Japan.
4One needs to distinguish between country variation in one or both regarding host and target countries,
correspondingly industry variation in one or both regarding host and target industries.
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on the choice of ownership such as wholly owned and joint ownership. The first is called
establishment mode and the second entry mode. In the context of the international business
literature our contribution lies within establishment mode literature. Slangen and Hennart
(2007) provide an overview over the most important studies in the establishment mode lit-
erature. Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007) are also studying the factors determining the
choice between acquisition and greenfield, as well as the establishment of wholly owned or
joint owned subsidiary.5 Equivalent they use the worldwide governance index to evaluate the
importance of a country’s level of institutional factors and control for firm-specific variables
such as experience and technology/advertising intensity. A distinguishing feature to our study
is the scope of firm-specific variables, model specification and source of data. The authors use
survey collected data of 160 Western European multinational firms investing in a pre-selected
set of Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1992-2002. The number of
observations is not given, industry specific variables are neglected and the timing of the in-
vestment decisions of the parent firms is not clear. Their results show that the institutional
environment of the subsidiary country is an important factor for the type of entry and owner-
ship choice. Larimo (2003) has a sample of 3,524 foreign entry mode decisions for parent firms
from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. He controls for firm and target country related
variables, though not for industry effects. His results show that the investment behavior re-
garding the entry type is not identical in all the Nordic countries. Swedish firms’ behavior
is more determined by target country variables, whereas Finnish and Norwegian firms are
influenced by both firm and target country related variables.6
The international trade literature developed theoretical models to formalize the invest-
ment decisions of multinational firms across countries. Only recently those models incorporate
differences in the modes of entry into foreign markets. Helpman et al. (2004) explains that
firms within industries will engage differently in FDI according to their cost schedules. By
5The authors present factors simultaneously determining both choices and estimate two different types
of models separately for each decision. They essentially test for 2 main hypothesis: 1. Higher institutional
development is positively correlated with the likelihood of acquisition and full ownership 2. Higher institutional
development results in a more pronounced likelihood for greenfield subsidiaries and joint ownership within
technology-intensive industries. Other studies in this field stress the importance of potential sequential decision
design Chang and Rosenzweig (2001).
6The sample is based on manufacturing firms undertaking foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments
during the period 1960-1999.
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paying a fixed cost, a firm can move its production facility to where it wants to serve the
foreign market and incurs for that reason no trade costs. The most productive firms will en-
gage in FDI, the intermediate productive firms will export and the least productive firms will
serve the domestic market. The authors do not yet distinguish the mode choice of FDI but
distinguish more traditionally between exporting and FDI. But it seems that the FDI they
have in mind is a greenfield investment. Yeaple (2009) suggests a “pecking order” of investing
firms across countries according to their firm productivity and country specific characteris-
tics. Nocke and Yeaple (2007) explore the nature of firm heterogeneity more closely. They
distinguish between mobile and non-mobile capabilities and how those affect the choice of FDI
mode. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) provide not only a theory for parent’s investment decision
but also an empirical estimation of their model predictions. Their model compromises firm
heterogeneity and countries differ by the cost of labor. Using U.S. data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis they confirm three of their model predictions.
First, U.S. multinational firms engaging in greenfield FDI are more efficient than
those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Second, U.S. multinational firms are
more likely to choose cross-border acquisition over greenfield FDI the more devel-
oped the host country. Third, U.S. multinational firms are more likely to choose
cross-border acquisition over greenfield FDI the closer is the geographical proxim-
ity of the host country to the U.S.7
In their model the two foreign market establishment modes have different set-up costs. The
greenfield investment involves set-up costs as a function of the country specific wage rate and
the labor productivity in that country. Whereas the acquisition investment is the market
price of the target. Cross-border acquisitions allow a multinational firm to combine its asset
in an optimal way, whereas greenfield set-ups allow the firm to transfer it’s own capabilities
to the foreign market. This difference in motives across the establishment modes is the reason
for the here presented empirical study.
Another aspect of this topic are the effects of entry mode on the subsidiary side. Not
7See Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
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exhaustively but rather by example we would like to mention studies in this area. One of
the first to mention is the literature on firm entry and exit as determinants for market per-
formance. The focus lies on post-entry performance of subsidiaries depending on the entry
type. New plant (greenfield) versus acquisition entry are compared within the manufacturing
sector in individual countries. For Canada see Baldwin (1995).8 For USA see Dunne et al.
(1988).9 The key results from this line of research is that not only does entry matters (it
does not happen only at the fringe), but the type of entry matters. Greenfield and acquisition
entry are both significant and long-lasting, but the types of entry follow quite different post-
entry growth patterns.10 We use this literature as a building stone to hypothesize, that not
only the established plants/subsidiaries are affected by the entry type, but most likely also
the majority owning parent firms. Still looking at subsidiary performance, Bertrand et al.
(2009) provide empirical results using Swedish firm survey data on how the entry mode af-
fects subsidiaries R&D activities. Their findings show that acquired subsidiary have a higher
propensity for R&D than greenfield subsidiaries. The authors conclude that ‘asset-seeking’ is
the main motive behind the acquisition.11
We would like to explore a new path of using data regarding the type of multinational
investment decision. The here presented method relies on ownership data and balance-sheet
8The author uses plant-level data of the Canadian Census data for the time 1970-1982. Plants belonging to
the same producers can be identified. Entry and exit are measured by examining changes in firm identifiers.
Various forms of control changes e.g. purchase of a plant, subsuming of one company under another or
integration of two corporate entities into a new one, can not be distinguished and all refer to merger activity.
Further he differentiates between outsiders and continuing firms at the industry level. Outsiders classify as
firms opening/closing a new plant across industries. Continuous firms are expanding/contracting within the
same industry level. This means that new plants can be created by new firms (outsiders) or by existing firms
(continuers); Existing plants can be acquired by new firms or by existing firms.
9The authors use U.S. data for the manufacturing industry for 5 census years (1963,1967,1972,1977,1982)
Three categories of entrants are analyzed. Entry through the construction of a new plant, diversifying firms
entering through the construction of a new plant and diversifying firms entering through change in their product
mix. The authors do not distinguish entry by acquisition, but the first two categories can be interpreted as
greenfield entry.
10Greenfield entering firms have a higher infant mortality rate and they tend to fail at higher rates than
older firms, but also a significant percentage of them exhibit strong post-entry growth and are still active a
decade after their entry. The two entry processes follow different paths in the post-entry growth phase. The
average share in terms of value-added for each type (greenfield/acquisition) of entry cohort increases at first
for both, the one for greenfield entrants continues to grow, whereas that of acquisition entrants begins to fall.
For more information see Baldwin (1995).
11In their basic probit estimation they have 2,063 observations of greenfield/acquisition subsidiaries from 5
surveys: 1970,1978,1990,1994,1998. We don’t observe enough Swedish firms in our data set to allow comparisons
regarding our proposed data methodology.
Regarding entry mode and R&D activities on the parent firms see Stiebale (2010). He estimates the effects of
foreign acquisitions on German parent firm R&D level.
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data that are compared at different point in times. This method might allow a wider access to
entry mode information for firms. The ultimate goal for this paper is to obtain results about
the determinants of parents entry mode decision in a given year for a variety of countries.12
The focus lies on a short-run analysis13 and compares the establishment of new subsidiaries
with acquired subsidiaries in several industries and countries. Comparing acquisition pro-
cesses to other changes affecting a parent firm such as the establishment of new subsidiaries
allows to get a better picture of determinants of investment decisions. Parent firms are con-
tinually active multinational firms. New non-acquired subsidiaries are defined as firms that
did not previously exist in that industry/country and have not been acquired. New acquired
subsidiaries are firms that did exist previously in that industry/country and a transfer of
ownership on the parent level took place. One drawback of the here presented analysis is
its short-run nature, as acquisition and merger activities come in waves. This implies that
the pattern of mode choice through subsidiary creation and acquisition may well differ across
time, because of variations in the timing and the intensity of merger and acquisition waves.14
3 Determinants of entry mode
Only recently the theoretical economic literature regarding trade and FDI is investigating
differences in the entry decision of multinational firms. The focus lies on three major lines of
arguments. The entry decision for a multinational firm depends on the firm characteristics,
but also on the industry and host/target country to be entered. Several studies have discussed
how a mix between firm ownership-industry-host country variables are decisive for the entry
mode.15
12The term entry of a new subsidiary is used here as the establishment of a subsidiary which is either newly
build or newly acquired. Entry does not necessarily refer to the first establishment within an industry/country.
13Theoretically the method can be extended to include several points in time. Due to data limitations we
focus on the decision within a one-year horizon.
14See Mueller (2003).
15See Larimo (2003), Slangen and Hennart (2007), Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007), the empirical part
of Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
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3.1 Firm characteristics
Firm size: The transaction cost theory argues that an acquisition is initially more capital
intense and therefore larger firms, with better access to capital funds, will tend to acquire
than to undertake greenfield investments. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H1: Larger firm will more likely do an acquisition investment than a greenfield investment.
Firm R&D intensity: Firm specific technological knowledge, e.g. marketing knowledge or
R&D needs to be protected against unwilling dissemination. Greenfield investments are
usually considered to be more appropriate than acquisitions if firm specific assets are sensible.
The transaction costs of a greenfield might be lower, as the knowledge can be installed
directly. Firms lacking firm specific technology knowledge have an incentive to internalize
it through acquisition.16 The threat of unprotected firm-specific know-how dissemination
might be lower in countries with high institutional quality. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H2: R&D intensive firms will more likely undertake a greenfield investments than acquisition
investments.
Firm Efficiency: Nocke and Yeaple (2008) present theoretical and empirical evidence suggest-
ing that firms favoring greenfield investment over cross-border acquisition are systematically
more efficient due to differences in their cost structures.17
H3: Efficient firms will more likely undertake greenfield investment than acquisition invest-
ments.
3.2 Host country characteristics
Country institutional development: Corporate governance theory suggests that more devel-
oped countries provide a less risky environment for multinational’s investments. According
to Caves (1982) less risk is involved in acquiring a firm than setting up a greenfield, because
the latter requires more in depth market information, is more time consuming and involves
16See Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and Slangen and Hennart (2007).
17The authors use sales and value added per employee to measure the efficiency of U.S. multinational firms.
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higher management costs. On the other hand, the higher the institutional environment,
the better are investors protected and the more able they are to enforce their rights. Even
though Antras et al. (2009) do not distinguish the different types of FDI, they show that in
the presence of monitoring problems between inventor and local entrepreneur, and due to
financial frictions the necessity for an external investor, leads to more FDI activity the higher
the institutional environment. Further strengthening this line of arguments, looking at the
empirical evidence of acquisition streams around the world, we observe that the majority
of foreign acquisitions are taking place between highly developed countries (e.g. U.S. and
Europe). This leads us to the following hypothesis.
H4: Firms tend to favor acquisition investments the higher developed the host country.
Country openness for trade: The possibility to acquire firms depends on the openness of
the trade policies and knowledge of the host country. The more open a host country, the
more readily available is information about the value of potential target firms. Information
asymmetries are more prevailing the less accessible a host country for international trade.
A multinational firm may opt for a greenfield investment to internalize those information
asymmetries. This strategy helps the multinational firm to avoid having to pay a higher
premium on target firms, if the true value of the firm is difficult to assess. This leads to the
following hypothesis.
H5: Firms tend to favor greenfield investment in countries less exposed to international
trade.
Geographical distance: Many studies in the establishment mode literature argue that the cul-
tural distance is an important factor for the establishment mode decision, but also regarding
the ownership type.18 Controlling for a distance measure allows to account for differences in
18Kogut and Singh (1988) analyze the effects of firms steaming from a variety of industries and countries
entering the USA. They distinguish in the choice of ownership type between joint venture and wholly owned
and entry type between acquisition and greenfield establishments. Using an index for cultural distance (based
on power distance, risk avoidance, importance of individualism) they conclude that cultural distance matters
significantly for the entry mode. The more cultural distance the more likely a firm will choose a joint venture
greenfield/acquisition over a wholly owned greenfield/acquistion. Cho and Padmanabhan (2005) analyze dif-
ferences in the ownership mode between Japanese firms and other host countries. They do not find significant
differences regarding cultural distance if one uses a single index for cultural distance. Instead if a measure for
firm-specific experience interacted with cultural distance is used, it is positively correlated with full ownership
of Japanese foreign manufacturing entities.
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the relative costs of the acquisition/greenfield entry modes depending on the geographical
proximity of the host country.19
H6: Firms tend to favor acquisition investments the further away the target country.
4 Data
Ideally we would like to use information about the incorporation (birth) of subsidiaries in dif-
ferent host countries for a stable set of parents, for which the mode of incorporation by parent
firm can unambiguously be determined. Either the newly incorporated subsidiary has been
acquired through an acquisition/merger or built as a greenfield investment by the parent firm.
Annual reports do not clearly identify greenfield investments, unlike acquisition and merger
activities. Sometimes new investment strategies are outlined, but in most annual reports
the information about greenfield investments is held rather general. Merger and acquisition
databases are commercially available, but firm-level greenfield databases are not widespread.
The very few data sets that exist, which distinguish the incorporation mode between green-
field and acquired subsidiaries are based on firm surveys. The U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) conducts a mandatory survey each year and therefore collects firm-level data
about U.S. parents’ foreign affiliates and their incorporation mode.20 The Swedish Research
Institute of Industrial Economics sends out a firm-level survey every 4 years to Swedish multi-
nationals to inquire about the incorporation mode of their foreign, majority-owned affiliates.21
Several studies use a Japanese database, which provides a complete list of firms and countries
for Japanese overseas investments.22 Most empirical studies regarding FDI in the economics
literature have used the data set of the BEA, which is not accessible for non-U.S. citizens. It
is important to evaluate if results obtained from U.S. multinational firms can directly infer
conclusions on the behavior of European multinational firms. European parent firms might
19See Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
20See Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Antras et al. (2009).
21The survey is not mandatory for firms to complete and covers all Swedish multinational firms in the
manufacturing sector Bertrand et al. (2009).
22Cho and Padmanabhan (2005) describe that for the period 1969-1991 the database consists of 1,519
manufacturing FDI’s by 402 manufacturing firms in 45 countries.
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follow very different investment strategies due to the diversity of legal backgrounds, institu-
tional environments, development of financial markets and corporate structure. We want to
explore the applicability of U.S. obtained results for European multinationals.
Various databases provide detailed firm-level, financial and ownership information, which
are quite accessible. The idea of this paper is to propose an alternative use of commonly
accessible databases to construct a data sample, which allows to investigate determinants of
incorporation mode choices for subsidiaries. We choose to concentrate on foreign subsidiaries
in order to compare our results to existing research. In the future we plan on extending the
analysis to domestic subsidiaries. In order to allow for a tight definition of acquisition and
greenfield investment, several criteria have been placed on the parent and the subsidiaries to
construct the sample. Implicit in the proposed data construction is the assumption, if the
subsidiary is new and has not been acquired, then it is a greenfield subsidiary. We concentrate
on listed parent firms and their decision to establish a new subsidiary in a foreign country in
2005.23 Ownership structures and financial information of parent firms are take from the Bu-
reau van Dijk Osiris database. Information about merger and acquisition have been provided
by Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database. Zephyr includes data on M&A, IPOs, Joint Ventures
and private equity transactions. The advantage of Zephyr compared to other M&A databases
such as Thompson Financial Securities is that in Zephyr all deals regardless of the deal value
are included.24
The first step is to determine which subsidiaries are newly established. Incorporation
dates for unlisted subsidiary firms are not available.25 For this reason we are using the own-
ership structure provided by Osiris at two different points in times and observe subsidiaries
entering as being newly established. A critical description of this step can be found in the ap-
pendix. We concentrate on listed parent firms in the year 2005 and their decision to establish
23The methodology can potentially be extended to include several years of decision making by the parent firm;
For a dynamic entry decision over time, the choice should allow for investment (by acquisition or greenfield)
and no investment in a given time period.
24Thompson Financial Securities includes only deals above USD 10 million. Stiebale (2010) compares ag-
gregate statistics for Zephyr and Thompson Financial Securities and reports that the coverage of transactions
above USD 10 million is very similar.
25Amadeus by BvD is a data base of listed and unlisted European firms including incorporation year. We
are interested in gathering the effects of multinational parent firms locating subsidiaries across the globe. We
especially emphasize the country dimension of subsidiary location. One could concentrate on the European
sub-sample of subsidiaries but the research question would be a different one.
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a subsidiary in a foreign country. We focus on subsidiaries with a direct ownership percentage
of at least 50 percent. To be a foreign subsidiary the subsidiary country needs to be different
to the parents origin country. For all parent firms of newly established subsidiaries, which are
majority owned, we find the corresponding acquisition activities for the whole time coverage
in the Zephyr database.26 Based on this information we determine which subsidiary has been
acquired and which one has not been acquired for each parent-subsidiary pair. For more
details on the sample construction see the appendix.
Using this method 1,470 listed parents from a variety of different origin countries have
been identified with at least one new subsidiary. Those parent firms include many of the
top 500 largest parent firms in the Osiris database in 2006.27 1,271 of those parent firms are
included in the M&A database and have made an acquiring investment at least once since
1998. A total of 6,631 subsidiaries have been identified as being newly established between
2005 and 2006. For the analysis of determinants of entry mode we will concentrate on U.S.
parent firms and European parent firms.
5 Estimation Methodology
In general the probability that a firm n chooses alternative i over j depends on the known
utility value Vni and the unknown part ni.
Pni = Prob(Vni + ni > Vnj + nj) ∀j 6= i (1)
The estimation technique here is a binary logit model of the likelihood of parents to acquire a
subsidiary or not, whereby Vn is linear in parameters with coefficient β, such that the choice
26This step assures that all acquisition activities of a parent firm are accounted for. For example the parent
firm acquires 10% of a subsidiary in 2000 and holds 50% of the same subsidiary in 2005, whereby the last
acquisition is missing in the data, then the subsidiary is still considered to be acquired.
27Not all top 500 largest firms are manufacturing firms.
13
probability is given as
P = G(Xβ) = 11 + eXβ (2)
X is a linear combination of variables such as a set of parent characteristics, industry char-
acteristics and host country characteristics and G is the logistic function.28 The dependent
variable is a binary variable for every subsidiary-parent-industry-country pair being 1 if the
subsidiary has been acquired, and 0 otherwise.29 The parent characteristics include a perfor-
mance measure such as Tobin’s Q averaged over the years 2003/2004, a firm size determinant
such as log of sales averaged over the years 2003/2004 and parent’s research and development
expenses averaged over the years 2003/2004. Tobin’s Q is defined as market capitalization
plus long term debt over total assets.30 The FDI literature measures the multinational ac-
tivity by counting the number of foreign subsidiaries or the number of countries with foreign
subsidiaries. Regarding the count of subsidiaries we use the status at the beginning of 2004.
For the other time varying we are using averages over the years 2003/2004 in order to reflect
parent’s status prior to the investment decision.31 The host country characteristics include
relevant variables for the location decision of the parent. We evaluate the quality of a sub-
sidiary country’s institutions using the worldwide governance index provided by the World
Bank. We average the six indicators over the years 2003/2004: (1) voice and accountability
(2) political stability (3) government effectiveness (4) regulatory quality (5) rule of law, and
(6) control of corruption. The indicators are constructed using the unobserved components
methodology described in Kaufmann et al. (2007). The indicators are measured in units rang-
ing from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. Further we use
other country development variables such as the log of GDP, population, import plus export
28See Train (2009).
29Note that Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007) define the dependent variable as being 1 if greenfield and
0 otherwise. We use the term establishment/entry mode interchangeably, which implies that the decision of
ownership is independent to the decision about the entry type. In our setting subsidiaries can either be wholly
owned greenfield (100%), majority owned greenfield (> 50% and < 100%), wholly owned acquisitions (100%)
or partially owned acquisitions (> 50% and < 100%).
30For a discussion on marginal versus average Tobin’s Q see Gugler et al. (2007).
31We have experimented with averages over the years 2004/2005 also 2003/2005 and the results are quanti-
tatively the same.
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over GDP and distance between parent and host country. Further we are adding colonial past
and common language in a later specification. All specifications include parent industry and
parent country of origin fixed effects. Our approach follows closely the estimation technique
of Nocke and Yeaple (2008) in order to assess if the methodology applied yields similar results
for a U.S. sample.
6 Results
Unlike any other empirical analysis previously, we use Tobin’s Q as a measure for firm ef-
ficiency. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) use parent firm sales and value-added per employee as a
measure of firm efficiency. Believing that sales is highly correlated with firm’s size, we opted
for Tobin’s Q as an alternative efficiency measure combined with firm’s sales. In a second
specification we include R&D expenses as a determinant for the entry mode decision. The
availability of R&D expenses cuts the sample size roughly in half. Regarding the host country
characteristics, geographical distance between home and host country is included to account
for entry mode preferences based on proximity. FDI might depend on the ease of access to
international trade, therefore a measure for a host country’s openness to international trade
is included. This is our basic specification, where we control for parent industry and country
fixed effects. We try to mirror the model specification used in Nocke and Yeaple (2008) to
evaluate the fit of our data base. They relate a parent’s mode choice to parent’s efficiency and
host country characteristics. Beside the difference in the firm efficiency measure, the authors
provide additional specifications including more firm characteristics such as a measure for
firm’s diversification across industries, a measure for vertical integration (the parent’s ratio of
intra firm imports to total imports) and an experience dummy variable for wether the parent
owned a subsidiary prior to the sample period in that country.32
Starting with the sample for U.S. parent firms, we are able to reproduce the key results by
32With our data set we can not compute the first two additionally employed variables as we don’t have
industry information of the subsidiary. We measure multinational experience as the number of majority owned,
foreign subsidiaries of a parent at the beginning of the sample period.
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Nocke and Yeaple (2008).33 Comparing the results for the first specification in table 3 to the
results of Nocke and Yeaple (2008), where they use sales as a firm efficiency measure and we
complement Tobin’s Q to it, we find a quantitatively similar effect. With respect to the other
coefficients, three out of four have the same sign. The country variables GDP, population and
distance are all increasing the likelihood of an acquisition. All of them are significant in our
data set. GDP and distance are significant in most specifications of Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
The measure for a country’s openness to trade is significantly negative in Nocke and Yeaple
(2008) but insignificantly positive in our specifications.34 In short, U.S. efficient parent firms
will more likely undertake greenfield investments than acquisition investments (H3). U.S.
parent firms tend to favor acquisition investments the higher the development status of the
host country (H4). U.S. parent firms are more likely to undertake an acquisition the farther
away the host country (H6). It seems that U.S. firms will favor greenfield investments in
countries which are less exposed to trade (H5), but this result is not statistically significant.
Like in Nocke and Yeaple (2008) the result about the efficiency of firms is robust, when we
introduce host country fixed effects (specification (3) of table 3). This is an important result
as it provides validity to the constructed database.
We therefore proceed to first narrow down the factors of host country development influ-
encing the entry mode choice, secondly to extend the analysis to European parent firms. In
specification (2) we introduce a measure for institutional quality of the host country ranging
from -2.5 to +2.5 according to 6 dimensions of institutional governance. We expect that in-
cluding such a measure will clarify through which channel the development of the host country
is influencing the entry mode of the parent. Indeed the institutional quality is an important
and significant determinant for the parent’s choice. The higher the institutional quality of the
host country, the more likely favor U.S. parent firms an acquisition over greenfield investment.
33The Bureau of Economic Analysis only includes U.S. firms with foreign subsidiaries above a certain size
threshold. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) pool over 5 years of firms together but they aggregate the data such that
‘for each firm, a country-industry pair appears at most once’, but the number of parent/subsidiary firms is not
given for their sample.
34Likelihood of acquisition results showing logit coefficients and (se) using U.S. data:
Nocke and Yeaple (2008) Sales GDP Population Open Distance Obs. LL
-0.217** 0.768** 0.049 -0.656** 0.199 856 -487.5
(0.076) (0.172) (0.092) (-0.187) (0.130)
Table 3 Tobin’s Q Sales GDP Population Open Distance Obs. LL
-0.275* 0.083 0.821*** 0.543** 0.302 1.084*** 1,342 -627.32
(0.13) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.22) 0.17
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The coefficient on GDP becomes surprisingly negative but remains insignificant.35 All other
coefficients remain quantitatively the same. In specification (4) of the same table, we include
R&D/sales as a measure for the parent firm research intensity. The sample size becomes
much smaller. The country relevant variables do not change much, but the coefficient on
firm’s efficiency looses its significance. At a later stage we no longer include R&D expenses
as a variable due to the small sample size. We could produce a measure for industry level
R&D expenses, but we control at the 3-digit level for all industry effects, such that the R&D
channel is compromised within those industry effects.
Turning now to the sample of European firms36 in table 4 we observe a different pattern
for the entry mode choice. First the firm efficiency measure remains insignificant varying pos-
itively/negatively around zero in the different specifications. GDP, population and openness
for trade are still positive and therefore increase the likelihood of acquisition. The distance
measure becomes significantly negative, indicating that European parent firms tend to favor
greenfield acquisitions the farther away the host country (this result is contradicting H6).
Acquisition activities are certainly in a closer range of geographical proximity and many Eu-
ropean parent firms have acquired strongly in neighboring Eastern European countries. This
can also be seen in the appendix figure 6. Introducing the measure for institutional quality
increases the likelihood of acquisition by a European parent firm. Those results imply that
results obtained for U.S. multinational firms can not straight forwardly be applied to explain
the behavior of European multinational firms.
In our last step we want to concentrate even more on country relevant variables. We
introduce a measure for the parent firm multinationality, one for corporate control and an
alternative distance measure. An ideal measure regarding the impact of transportation cost
differences on the entry mode would be the exact geographical distance between the home
and foreign location. In the absence of such a distance measure37 we experiment using land
border dummy instead of geographical country distance from capital to capital. In a large
35The governance index is highly correlated with GDP (ρ = 0.88).
36The estimation sample includes parents from Belgium (7.62%), Switzerland (5.34%), Germany (12.48%),
Spain (2.65%), France (22.67%), UK (11.92%), Italy (22.90%), Netherlands (11.73%), Portugal (0.15%) and
Sweden (2.54%).
37The main address of parent firm is available but the exact subsidiary location within the host country is
not.
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country such as the U.S. most industrial firms will not be located close to the capital e.g.
Silicon Valley firms will have a greater proximity to Canada or Mexico than to their own
capital. The distance measure might in such cases be misleading. To proxy the degree of
multinationality of the parent firm we count the majority owned, foreign subsidiaries prior to
acquisition/greenfield investment. Corporate control is the degree of ownership a parent has
in the subsidiary. Based on the data base construction we allow subsidiaries in either entry
mode to have an ownership percentage between 50% and 100%. In table 5 provides results for
U.S. parent firms and table 6 for Western European parent firms. For comparison purposes,
the first column of the tables is identical to specification (2) of table 3 and respectively table
4.
With respect to characteristics of U.S. parent firms, including the additional variables
absorbs the effect of parent firms productivity.38 The higher the number of foreign subsidiary,
the higher the likelihood of acquisition compared to greenfield investment. Both variables are
highly significant for U.S. parent firms, which can not be shown for European parent firms.
It seems that firm characteristics do not have a distinguishing effect on the mode of entry for
European parent firms. Regarding the host country characteristics, not surprisingly the land
border dummy is negative and significant for U.S. parent firms. But for European parent
firms this variable does not seem to pick up the effect that the distance measure had before.
Including common colonial history or language is not a distinguishing feature regarding the
entry mode decision neither for U.S. nor Wester European parent firms. The worldwide gov-
ernance index remains significant for both sets of parent firms in all specifications.
In summary, the evidence shows that firm heterogeneity is important for U.S. multina-
tional firms in determining their entry mode choice. This is not a distinguishing feature for
European multinational firms. For both sets of parents the host country characteristics play
an important role in deciding on the entry mode. Higher institutional quality increases the
likelihood of acquisitions versus greenfield investments.
38This result is mainly driven by the ownership percentage of the parent firm in the subsidiary. The tighter
the ownership, the higher the probability of an acquisition. This could be explained because the tighter the
ownership the less different are the two entry modes as asymmetric information is reduced in both entry modes.
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Table 1: Number of firms and regional distribution
Parent home country USA Europe
Parents 302 591
Subsidiaries 1,465 3,346
Percentage of Subsidiaries
Western Europe 33.29 41.64
Eastern Europe 5.74 12.27
North America 10.02 23.63
Middle/South America 19.58 10.77
Asia 20.50 13.49
Africa 2.11 3.12
Arab 2.57 2.45
South Pacific 6.20 2.63
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics parent firm and subsidiary country by parent origin
Parent home country USA Europe
Mean Std Mean Std
Parent firm
Acquisition 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.46
Sales (1000 mil USD) 9.9 2.4 11.1 1.98
(Profit-loss)/total assets (th USD) 0.044 0.096 0.032 0.067
Market capitalization (mil USD) 22.6 52.7 9.7 21.5
Tobin’s Q 2.19 1.45 1.43 0.89
R&D/sales (th USD) 0.125 0.78 0.06 0.35
Ownership percentage 72.6 24.01 87.9 19.99
Number of subsidiaries 79.7 125.4 142.4 192.1
Number of foreign subsidiaries ownership > 45% 44.6 91.5 71.8 106.3
Number of shareholders 16.9 6.4 9.9 13.1
Percentage largest shareholders: Bank 0.29 0.46 0.23 0.42
Percentage largest shareholders: Family 0.13 0.39 0.14 0.35
Percentage largest shareholders: State 0 0 0.04 0.18
Percentage largest shareholders: Industrial Firm 0.05 0.23 0.38 0.48
Percentage largest shareholders: Dispersed 0.52 0.49 0.22 0.41
Host country
Governance index (GI) 0.78 0.84 0.79 0.84
Distance (th miles) btw. home/host countries 2,729 1,332 2,633 2090
(Import+export)/GDP 93.5 90.1 77.1 66.7
GDP 21,847 12,584 23,173 13,472
Population 1.40e8 3.14e8 1.77e8 3.25e8
Land border btw. home/host countries 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35
Stock market capitalization/GDP 0.78 0.79 0.73 0.59
Private credit/GDP 0.83 0.47 0.97 0.62
Notes:
All variables represent mean values per firm/country over years 2003/2004. Acquisition is a dummy variable 1 if subsidiary was acquired.
To reflect the status influencing the actual choice of the parent firm. Tobin’s Q is market capitalization + depreciation over total assets.
Ownership is the percentage the parent owns of the subsidiary. Number of subsidiaries a parent firm holds regardless of ownership percentage.
Number of foreign subsidiaries a parent firm holds with ownership of at least 45%. Number of shareholders that hold stakes in parent firm.
Percentage of largest shareholder refers to the stake being held in the parent firm. GI is an indicator for institutional quality of country.
Distance is the geographical distance between home/host country. Land border is a dummy variable 1 if common border, 0 otherwise.
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Table 3: Likelihood of acquisition of subsidiaries depending on parent firm and host country
U.S. parent firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parent firm characteristics
Log Sales 0.083 0.087 0.096 -0.081
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Tobin’s Q -0.275* -0.278* -0.236* -0.226
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Log R&D/Sales -0.153
(0.15)
Host country characteristics
Log (Import+Export)/GDP 0.302 0.301 0.255
(0.22) (0.21) (0.29)
Log Distance 1.084*** 0.970*** 1.084***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.24)
Log GDP 0.821*** -0.149 -0.709*
(0.18) (0.28) (0.32)
Log Population 0.543*** 0.547*** 0.483**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
GI 0.998*** 1.455***
(0.27) (0.39)
FE: Parent Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: Parent Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: Subsidiary Country No No Yes No
Nb of Subsidiaries 1,342 1,342 1,252 715
Nb of Parents 271 271 265 156
Log-Likelihood -627.32 -618.37 -555.29 -332.42
Pseudo-R2 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.23
Notes:
The standard errors are in parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity, allow for clustering by parent firm.
* Significance level at 10%, ** Significance level at 5%, *** Significance level at 1%.
Log Sales is log sales of parent firm averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Tobin’s Q is parent’s market capitalization plus depreciation over total assets averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log R&D/Sales is the log of parent’s R&D expenses over total sales averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log (Import+Export)/GDP is the trade ratio to GDP btw. parent and host country averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log Distance is the geographical distance in miles between parent and host country.
Log GDP is the log of real GDP of the host country averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log Population is the log of population of the host country for year 2003/2004.
GI is the worldwide governance index averaged per host country over the years 2003/2004.
Table 4: Likelihood of acquisition of subsidiaries depending on parent firm and host country
European parent firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parent firm characteristics
Log Sales 0.033 0.037 -0.004 0.077
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Tobin’S Q 0.047 0.055 -0.011 -0.022
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Log R&D/Sales 0.126
(0.17)
Host country characteristics
Log (Import+Export)/GDP 0.348* 0.372* 0.245
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Log Distance -0.260*** -0.208** -0.148
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
Log GDP 0.683*** 0.199 0.181
(0.12) (0.21) (0.27)
Log Population 0.442*** 0.472*** 0.454***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
GI 0.550* 0.583*
(0.24) (0.28)
FE: Parent Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: Parent Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE: Subsidiary Country No No Yes No
Nb of Subsidiaries 2,677 2,677 3,109 1,337
Nb of Parents 433 433 533 198
Log-Likelihood -1304.94 -1299.69 -1514.10 -726.81
Pseudo-R2 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.17
Notes:
The standard errors are in parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity, allow for clustering by parent firm.
* Significance level at 10%, ** Significance level at 5%, *** Significance level at 1%.
Log Sales is log sales of parent firm averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Tobin’s Q is parent’s market capitalization plus depreciation over total assets averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log R&D/Sales is the log of parent’s R&D expenses over total sales averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log (Import+Export)/GDP is the trade ratio to GDP btw. parent and host country averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log Distance is the geographical distance in miles between parent and host country.
Log GDP is the log of real GDP of the host country averaged over the years 2003/2004.
Log Population is the log of population of the host country for year 2003/2004.
GI is the worldwide governance index averaged per host country over the years 2003/2004.
Table 5: Likelihood of acquisition of subsidiaries additional ownership and country variables
U.S. parent firms
(1) (2) (3)
Parent firm characteristics
Log Sales 0.087 -0.087 -0.089
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Tobin’s Q -0.278* -0.146 -0.133
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ownership 0.050*** 0.049***
(0.01) (0.01)
Host country characteristics
Log (Import+Export)/GDP 0.301 -0.204 -0.098
(0.21) (0.23) (0.27)
Log Distance 0.970*** 0.502**
(0.17) (0.21)
Land Border -0.589*
(0.28)
Log GDP -0.149 -0.199 -0.109
(0.28) (0.32) (0.36)
Log Population 0.547*** 0.232* 0.292**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
GI 0.998*** 0.895** 0.660*
(0.27) (0.29) (0.32)
Colony 0.213
(0.33)
Language 0.048
(0.23)
FE: Parent Industry Yes Yes Yes
FE: Parent Country Yes Yes Yes
FE: Subsidiary Country No No No
Nb of Subsidiaries 1,342 1,165 1,165
Nb of Parents 271 219 219
Log-Likelihood -627.32 -469.52 -467.92
Pseudo-R2 0.21 0.31 0.31
The standard errors are in parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity, allow for clustering by parent firm.
Foreign Subsidiaries is the number of foreign subsidiaries of parent firm with ownership > 49% in 2004.
Ownership is ownership percentage of parent firm in the subsidiary.
Land Border is a dummy variable indicating 1 for a common land border btw. parent/subsidiary countries.
Colony is a dummy variable indicating 1 if parent and subsidiary have a common colonial past.
Language is a dummy variable indicating 1 if parent and subsidiary share a common language.
Table 6: Likelihood of acquisition of subsidiaries additional ownership and country variables
European parent firms
(1) (2) (3))
Parent firm characteristics
Log Sales 0.037 0.026 0.035
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Tobin’s Q 0.055 0.051 0.042
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Foreign Subsidiaries -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Ownership 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Host country characteristics
Log (Import+Export)/GDP 0.372* 0.484** 0.410**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
Log Distance -0.208** -0.213**
(0.07) (0.08)
Land Border -0.098
(0.24)
Log GDP 0.199 0.051 0.211
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Log Population 0.472*** 0.475*** 0.501***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
GI 0.550* 0.860** 0.605**
(0.24) (0.29) (0.27)
Colony -0.0003
(0.32)
Language 0.283
(0.25)
FE: Parent Industry Yes Yes Yes
FE: Parent Country Yes Yes Yes
FE: Subsidiary Country No No No
Nb of Subsidiaries 2,677 2,590 2,587
Nb of Parents 422 429 429
Log-Likelihood -1304.94 1224.76 1218.63
Pseudo-R2 0.21 0.21 0.21
The standard errors are in parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity, allow for clustering by parent firm.
Foreign Subsidiaries is the number of foreign subsidiaries of parent firm with ownership > 49% in 2004.
Ownership is ownership percentage of parent firm in the subsidiary.
Land Border is a dummy variable indicating 1 for a common land border btw. parent/subsidiary countries.
Colony is a dummy variable indicating 1 if parent and subsidiary have a common colonial past.
Language is a dummy variable indicating 1 if parent and subsidiary share a common language.
7 Conclusion
The decision on how to enter a foreign market - by acquiring an existing subsidiary or by
establishing a new subsidiary - gives important insights about the workings of multinational
firms. This area of research still offers an amplitude of possibilities for theoretical and em-
pirical studies. The empirical evidence is quite heterogenous and replicability of estimates is
difficult due to data limitations. We propose a transparent and replicable method to construct
a data base. This method allows to compare the investment behavior of U.S. based multi-
nationals to the one of Western European based multinationals. Our key results show, that
profitable U.S. parents prefer greenfield investments as entry mode into foreign markets. Firm
specific characteristics of Western European parent firms do not have a significant effect with
respect to variation in the mode choice. Our results imply that empirical evidence regarding
the entry mode decision of U.S. parent firms do not necessarily answer questions about the
behavior of Western European parent firms. But for both sets of parent firms it shows, that
the higher the institutional quality of the subsidiary country to be entered, the more likely
will parent firms choose to acquire the subsidiary rather than to do a greenfield investment.
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Appendices
This section provides detailed information regarding the sample construction and underlying
assumptions. We present a unique approach to construct a database to differentiate the estab-
lishment mode of parents entering a foreign market. We combine several different databases
to obtain such database. First, we present an overview of the different data sources, see table
7. The main data sources are an ownership (Osiris) and an acquisition (Zephyr) data base
from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD). We complement those with information for country related
variables. We use a three step procedure to combine the data bases and present empirical
evidence on each of the three steps.
Step one is to select a sample of parents, which have established new subsidiaries domes-
tically and/or abroad. We define a parent-subsidiary pair as being new if the subsidiary was
not observed in t but is observed in t+1. Parent-subsidiary pairs being observed at both
points in time, t and t+1, are called matched subsidiaries. Parent-subsidiary pairs that are
observed in t and no longer in t+1 are called divested subsidiaries. The term divestiture
usually means the disposal of an asset through sale or closure. Another reason here could be
that a parent firm changes the direct ownership structure within its business conglomerate.
E.g. parent firm holds 100% of both subsidiaries B and C in t. The parent firm changes the
corporate control structure such that in t+1 B owns C with 100% and the parent holds only
an ultimate 100% ownership in C. In this sense divested subsidiaries are the result of either
a sale, closure or change of corporate control structure.39
Step two involves the merger and acquisition data base. We use the same parents identi-
fied in the first step and find all acquisition activities corresponding to that parent. A dummy
variable indicates, if the new and foreign subsidiaries can be matched to an acquisition activ-
ity. This results in the final sample (the third step).
In the next section, we present the criteria that we applied to the data to select the firms
at each step. In figure 1 we show how the different data sources, together with the selection
criteria that have been applied to obtain the final data sample. Table 8 presents the number
39Throughout the text we do not refer to the classical term of ‘divestiture’, but rather to the one described
above.
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of observations corresponding to each of the selection criteria. In the last two sections, we
present descriptive statistics regarding the first and second step of the data base construction.
Our goal is to provide a transparent and replicable guide for this database. The summary
statistics presented in the main part of the paper refer to the final sample.
A Data sources
Table 7 provides an overview of the data sources used to create the data sample.
Table 7: Data Sources
Variables Source Provider
Ownership Osiris disc 45, 53, 62 BvD
Financial variables listed firms Osiris disc 45, 53, 62 BvD
Financial variables unlisted firms Amadeus disc 128 BvD
Governance indicators (GI) Kaufmann et al. (2007) Worldbank
GDP, Population Penn World Tables 6.3 webpage (2010a)
Country distance, colony and Rose (2005) webpage (2010b)
Country language, border
Country (import+export)/GDP Rose (2007) webpage (2010b)
Rose and Spiegel (2010) webpage (2010b)
B Criteria for samples selection
Selection criteria for firms in the ownership data base.
• Parent firms need to be observable for at least 2 consecutive years (that means to be
included in three consecutive Osiris data disks, namely 45, 53, 62;)
• Parent firms main industry is in the tradable good sector. This implies all industries
within SIC 100 to 399.
• Parent firms have a direct ownership stake in the subsidiary of at least 50%.
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• Subsidiary firms must be classified as industrial companies (in order to exclude pure
financial investment e.g. fund participation).
For this selection, we determine all subsidiaries that can be matched based on the same firm
identifier or by the same name. The subsidiary name match requires that the subsidiary with
an identical name needs to be located in the same country. In a second step we determine
the subsidiaries disappearing and newly appearing by comparing the ownership structure in
2005 (Osiris BvD disk 53) to the one in 2006 (Osiris BvD disk 62). In a third step we want
to ensure that we correctly identify the newly appearing subsidiaries. If a subsidiary newly
appears and one with an almost identical name in the same country disappears, we do not
consider this subsidiary as being new (but rather mismatched). This is a precautious step in
order to avoid miss-categorization due to spelling mistakes.
Selection criteria for firms in the acquisition data base.
• Acquiring firms must have at least one M&A activity since 1995 to be included in the
Zephyr data base.
• Acquiring firm main industry activity lies within SIC 100 to 399.
• First we match the deals to new subsidiaries using all completed deal types.
• Second we augment the database with deals, where we don’t find a matching new sub-
sidiary, if the deal type has a final stake of more than 50% and the acquiring country is
not equal to the target country.40
Osiris and Zephyr are offered by the same database provider Bureau van Dijk (BvD). Each
firm is assigned a unique firm identifier, which is then used for both databases. Unfortunately
firm identifiers for identical firms do not seem to match in all cases. We relied not only
on matching firm identifiers but also resorted to name matching. From all the parent firms
40This step makes sure that all relevant merger & acquisition deals of a parent are included, even if for some
reason we do not find a ‘new’ subsidiary using the ownership structure between the two points of time. Less
than 5% of all acquired subsidiaries account to this procedure.
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having newly established subsidiaries only 5% cannot be linked to the merger and acquisition
database. 10 firms have been selected randomly and their online annual reports have been
searched to find indication if those firms should have been included in the merger database.
The random sample for parent firms showed that those firms are indeed not acquiring firms.
For those parent firms that have been matched between Osiris and Zephyr, all acquisition
activities for targets are matched against the subsidiaries. This match has been performed
by target/subsidiary firm identifier, target/subsidiary name and hand selection to account for
spelling differences.
Figure 1 and table 8 provide a scheme of the selection rules and how the different data sources
have been combined. The encircled numbers in the figure refer to the three different steps on
how we have constructed the database. Step 1 refers to the raw data on ownership structure.
Step 2 refers to the raw data from the merger and acquisition data base. Finally step 3 applies
the selection rules to the ownership and acquisition data and results in the data sample that
we base our estimations on. The table 8 shows the number of parent/subsidiary firms by
parent home country at each step of the selection.
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Figure 1: Construction of data base
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Figure shows the combination of different data sources. The encircled numbers correspond to the different steps.
C Analysis of ownership structure (step 1)
C.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2 looks at the ownership data before selection rules are applied and gives answers to
the question how many subsidiaries do firms from Europe/USA have in general, how many
domestic and how many foreign ones. How many of those subsidiaries do not observe an own-
ership change for the same parent, how many do observe an ownership change from within the
year 2005. We observe that European parent firms have more than a third more subsidiaries
than U.S. parent firms. The distribution of matched, new and divested subsidiaries is quite
heterogenous across parent countries. Figure 3 seeks to answer the question concentrating
on European/US parents, in which world region are their subsidiaries located? Do we ob-
serve regional differences with respect to the change in ownership of subsidiaries within the
year 2005. European parent firms have most subsidiaries in Western Europe. Compared to
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Table 8: Number of firms from different data sources
Parent/ Subsidiary/ Parent/ Subsidiary/
Acquirer Target Acquirer Target
Parent home country USA Europe
Ownership data step 1 2,250 37,045 1,920 62,743
new entry 757 4,224 1,130 10,482
industrial firm 752 4,102 1,115 10,207
> 50% & not missing 701 3,613 917 5,077
Cross-country 378 1,518 667 3,576
Acquisition data step 2 1,583 2,765 2,555 3,881
Cross-country 492 721 1,068 1,736
Sample data step 3 302 1,465 591 3,346
Notes:
The tables indicates each step of the data base construction.
Step 1: Basic ownership structure. Step 2: Basic acquisition structure.
Step 3: Selection rules applied to basic ownership and acquisition structure.
U.S. parents, European parents have more subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. Surprisingly U.S.
parent firms are not more engaged in Middle/South America than European multinationals.
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Figure 2: Where do parent firms with subsidiaries come from?
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Notes:
Panel left shows subsidiaries matched, divested and new by parent origin country.
E.g. US parent firms have approx. 38,000 subsidiaries. Approx. 1/7 are new subsidiaries.
Panel right shows domestic/foreign subsidiaries matched, divested and new by parent origin country.
E.g. European parent firms have more than 39,000 foreign subsidiaries. 1/5 are new subsidiaries.
Matched subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t and t+1 to the same parent.
Divested subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t but not in t+1 to the same parent.
New subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t+1 but not in t to the same parent.
C.2 Miss-classification of subsidiaries
Due to the lack of data on the incorporation date of subsidiary firms we resort to comparing
the parent-subsidiary structure at two different point in time, to assess which subsidiary was
newly established. One might be concerned that miss-matching of parent-subsidiary pairs
between t and t+1 is an issue e.g. subsidiary B in a particular country is present in t and not
in t+1. Therefore we classify B as a divested subsidiary. Subsidiary C of the same parent in
the same country is not present in t but appears in t+1. We classify C as a new subsidiary.
Unobserved to us - a name change/change in firm identifier causes B and C to be the same
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Figure 3: Where do European/US parent firms have their subsidiaries?
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Notes:
The figure shows the regional distribution of all subsidiaries by parent origin country.
E.g. European parents have ca. 45,000 subsidiaries in Western Europe. Only 1/6 are new subsidiaries.
Matched subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t and t+1 to the same parent.
Divested subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t but not in t+1 to the same parent.
New subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t+1 but not in t to the same parent.
subsidiary. If such cases are frequently observed in the data then the ratio of new over the sum
of new and divested subsidiaries per country and parent firm would show an accumulation
around the midpoint of the distribution (possibly bell shaped). We plot the ratio in figure 4
and find that most cases occur at the opposing ends of the distribution. We are not able to
resolve the issue of renaming of subsidiaries as such, but conclude that miss-matching between
new and divested subsidiaries within the same country and parent firm does not seem to be
frequent.
Another concern is the classification of subsidiaries being acquired or a greenfield invest-
ment. A greenfield investment is a newly established subsidiary, which has not been acquired.
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Figure 4: Are new subsidiaries in reality divested subsidiaries due to miss-matching?
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Notes:
The figure shows the ratio of new/(new+divested) subsidiaries per country and parent firm.
Divested subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t but not in t+1 to the same parent.
New subsidiary means that the subsidiary belongs in t+1 but not in t to the same parent.
How can it be verified if a subsidiary, which has not been acquired (according to the here pre-
sented methodology) is indeed a greenfield subsidiary? With respect to greenfield investments
annual reports and business journals usually report investment expansions e.g. creating a new
plant or increasing investment in a particular region. Such an investment might or might not
go hand in hand with incorporating a new subsidiary. This makes it very difficult to verify if
a subsidiary, which is a new subsidiary in the organizational structure of the firm (according
to the Osiris ownership structure) is indeed a greenfield investment.41 Not being acquired,
41Harsco announces 2004/2005 to expand its division line MultiServ in several regions such as in Guatemala,
Mexico, United Kingdom and Spain. Using the here presented methodology, we find newly established green-
field subsidiaries belonging to the MultiServ division line in Guatemala, Mexico and Spain. Although quite
likely that increased investment in a region is correlated with incorporating a new establishment in the region,
we don’t know for certain that those subsidiaries are indeed incorporated as greenfield start-ups.
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means that for the same parent, we are not able to find a match in the merger database based
on the subsidiaries name or firm identifier.
What - if not a greenfield investment - could those subsidiary mistakenly represent?
(a) The subsidiary is not new:
We observe approximately 25 parent firms for which more than 20 subsidiaries are newly
established within the year period. This could either be a firm heavily expanding or a data
entry problem in the ownership structure. Whereas the latter occurs in the case that the
ownership structure of Osiris does not provide an exact account of the subsidiaries belonging
to each parent at a particular point in time. Example: The ownership structure reveals
that a parent firm, Harsco Corporation, has no subsidiary in Guatemala by the end of fiscal
year 2004; but by the end of fiscal year 2005, Harsco owns a subsidiary in Guatemala called
Multiserv Guatemala SA. According to the SEC 10-K filing of Harsco Multiserv Guatemala
SA is a 100% owned subsidiary already by the end of fiscal year 2002. This results in a false
classification of Harsco corporation subsidiaries as greenfield investments in 2005. If this
is due to a data entry problem of the ownership structure of the parent firm, then several
subsidiaries will appear to be newly established, when in reality they are not. Although
such a database mistake is potentially observable, there is no reason to believe that such
a database error is the result of a systematic pattern. Knowing the exact incorporation
date of a subsidiary would certainly help. Due to the lack of this data, we resort to other
data sources. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requires publicly traded firms
to disclose information among other things about their ownership structure (Ex.21 of the
K-10 form to be filed); A list of subsidiaries/affiliates from the end of fiscal year 2004 was
compared to the list from the end of fiscal year 2005. This allows us for a sample of US
firms to verify if a subsidiary is indeed newly established within the applicable time period.
Securities and Commission (2010) 42 The Amadeus database contains unlisted and listed
42U.S. parent firms sample background check:
Arch Chemicals Inc: none of the 4 new subsidiaries appear in SEC filings 31.12.2003. All subsidiaries can be
found in the SEC filing of 31.12.2005.
Conocophillis: only 4 of the 25 new subsidiaries appear in SEC filings 31.12.2003 and have been dropped from
the sample.
Federal Mogul Corp: none of the 42 new subsidiaries appear in SEC filings 31.12.2003. All subsidiaries can be
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firms in Europe. Further it includes the incorporation year of firms. The last available
Amadeus database to us (Amadeus disc 128) includes firms up to incorporation year 2004
(mostly up to 2003). As an additional consistency check we would expect a poor match of
the subsidiaries in our sample to the Amadeus disc 128, as the firms in our sample should
be incorporated after 2004. If we find the majority of subsidiaries matching the firms in
the Amadeus disc 128, it would be an indicator that subsidiaries have been incorporated
at a prior time and are therefore not newly established subsidiaries. Indeed we don’t find
a high percentage of matches (approximately 10%), suggesting that most of the European
subsidiaries in our sample are not incorporated prior to 2004. The ones for which we found
a positive match were then not included in the final sample.
(b) The ‘greenfield’ subsidiary is in fact an acquired subsidiary:
It is important to define what a greenfield investment really represents. The empirical appli-
cations in the literature differ with respect to the definition of greenfield investment. For the
US, the Bureau of Economic Analysis provides firm-level survey data about all U.S. foreign
affiliates above a certain size threshold detailing the mode choice of the affiliate Nocke and
Yeaple (2008). Larimo (2003) defines greenfield investment as a start-up investment involv-
ing a new facility. He uses data drawn from annual reports, business journals and direct
contacts with the firms. The exact definition was not provided. Bertrand et al. (2009) do
not provide an explicit definition of greenfield investment but distinguish them from acquired
affiliates using survey data on Swedish multinational firms. According to our definition a
greenfield subsidiary is a subsidiary, for which we can not find a match in the acquisition
data base. It is although possible not to find a match with an acquisition due to the fact
that a re-arrangement of ownership hierarchy takes place. E.g. Firm A acquires firm B
found in the SEC filing of 31.12.2005.
Hewlett Packard: none of the 7 new subsidiaries appear in SEC filings 31.12.2003. 5 subsidiaries can be found
in the SEC filing of 31.12.2005, 2 in SEC filing 31.12.2006.
European Parent firms background check:
Henkel KGAA: about one third of new 99 subsidiaries appear in SEC filings 31.12.2003 and have therefore
been dropped from the sample.
UCB NV SA: none of the subsidiaries appear in SEC filings 31.12.2003. All subsidiaries can be found in the
SEC filing of 31.12.2005. But one subsidiary was not recognized as being an acquired subsidiary (UCB NV SA
(BE) acquires Celltech (GB) all new subsidiaries from the Celltech acquisition are coded as acquired but one
subsidiary Medeva Pharma Suisse AG not.
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and firm C is a 100% subsidiary of firm B. After the acquisition Firm A changes the total
ownership structure of the corporation and A now owns C directly. C does not show up
for the acquisition of B by A. We would falsely classify C as a new subsidiary, which has
not been acquired. This is indeed problematic, but we believe that on average corporations
do not immediately after acquisitions change the ownership hierarchy and therefore don’t
believe in a systematic pattern creating such observations.
D Descriptive analysis of acquisition structure (step 2)
We use the Zephyr data base and select acquiring firms active in the tradable good industry
and acquisition deals with a final stake of at least 50% in the year 2004 and 2005. We can
observe the domestic and foreign acquisitions per parent country in figure 5. U.S. parent firms
account for the majority of acquisition deals. Approximately two-thirds of acquisitions by U.S.
parent firms are domestic, an indication that for future research domestic subsidiaries should
not be neglected. With respect to European parent firms not surprisingly the UK shows the
highest frequency of acquisition deals, whereby only a third involves a foreign target. Parent
firms from Germanic and Nordic countries exhibit half of their acquisition deals being foreign
targets.
If we are interested in the question where are the target firms of U.S. and European parent
firms located, figure 6 provides the answer. It shows that European parent firms acquire
heavily in Eastern Europe domestically and foreign, in North America and predominantly
in Western Europe. U.S. parent firms acquired predominantly in North America and to a
much smaller extend in Western Europe. Surprisingly small is the acquisition frequency in
Middle/South America and Asia.
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Figure 5: How many domestic/foreign acquisitions do we observe per parent country?
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Notes:
The figure shows the number of majority acquiring merger and acquisitions within 2004/2005 for parents
from the manufacturing industry. We differentiates between domestic and foreign targets;
e.g. In 2005 US parent firms have acquired approx. 1,500 targets, 1/3 of it are foreign acquisitions.
38
Figure 6: What are the target regions of European/US acquiring parents?
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Notes:
The figure shows the number of majority acquiring merger and acquisitions in 2005 for parents
from the manufacturing industry by target region, differentiating by domestic/foreign acquisitions.
E.g. European parents acquired approx. 1,400 Western European targets. 1/3 are foreign acquisitions.
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Abstract
The dissertation investigates the economic relationship between subsidiary and parent
firms. Subsidiaries and their parent firms are economic entities tied together by varying
degrees of ownership. This special structure allows for within the firm corporate gover-
nance transfers and investment streams that influence the performance of the group-firm
as a whole. A variety of data sources was used to construct a firm-level data set con-
sisting of subsidiary firms and their corresponding parent firms. Such a data set allows
investigation of important economic questions. Several econometric methods are applied
to obtain empirical estimates documenting the underlying dynamics between subsidiaries
and parent firms. Three lines of questions have been studied and are presented in separate
chapters.
The first one asks the question, what determines the investment performance of group
firms?1 Do subsidiaries belonging to a group of firms behave differently in their invest-
ment behavior compared to stand-alone firms. We derive empirical predictions from the
standard investment cash flow framework on the functioning of internal capital markets.
We test these predictions using a data set of parent firms and their listed and unlisted
subsidiaries in 82 countries over the period 1988-2005. In the presence of capital mar-
ket imperfections subsidiaries are able to benefit from their group structure by accessing
capital funds provided by parent firms. Furthermore the study reveals that company and
country institutional structures matter.
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Another set of questions concern the institutional determinants of subsidiaries’ per-
formance.2 The quality of country institutions has an important impact on a firm’s
performance. We use a country-specific measure for institutional quality, which is based
on six time varying dimensions: Voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality,
control of corruption, governmental efficiency and political stability. Firms belonging to a
group of firms originating in different institutional backgrounds are exposed to influences
from different countries with varying degrees of institutional quality. Is it the institutional
quality in the parent firms country that affects the performance of a subsidiary, the insti-
tutional quality in the subsidiary’s country that is important, or both. We utilize the data
set of more than 23,000 listed and unlisted subsidiaries of parent firms worldwide over the
period 1994-2005. The results indicate that good institutions (measured by a worldwide
governance indicator) lead to better performance for subsidiaries of parent firms. A trans-
fer of good corporate governance by parent firm to its subsidiaries can be observed.
Yet the third line poses the question: Do we observe differences in multi-national firms
depending on how they choose their market entries in foreign markets?3 Multinational
firms expand their firm’s reach into new markets through acquisition of existing assets,
namely investment through merger & acquisition (M&A), or through investment in new
assets, namely greenfield investment. Those two entry modes are types of foreign di-
rect investment (FDI). Accurately differentiating between M&A activities and other FDI
strategies is important for a number of reasons. First, such events represent a substantial
restructuring of economic activity for both the parent and the subsidiary firm. Secondly,
the entry strategy might be directly correlated with characteristics of the host country
e.g. countries with high institutional quality may attract more of one type of entry deci-
sions by the parent. A new and unique method of constructing a data base, which allows
to differentiate between acquired and non-acquired subsidiaries, is presented. The study
reveals that the determinants for the entry decision of parent firms is different if they are
located in the U.S.A. or in Western Europe. Higher institutional development in the host
country increases the probability of entry through an acquisition investment relative to a
greenfield investment.
2‘Institutional Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Subsidiaries’ Performance’
Co-authored: K.Gugler, E.Kalkbrenner, D.C.Mu¨ller and E.Peev.
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Zusammenfassung
Die einzelnen Forschungsfragen dieser Dissertation untersuchen verschiedene Aspekte
der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Mutter- und Tochtergesellschaften. Eine Toch-
tergesellschaft ist ein rechtlich unabhängiges Unternehmen, welches allerdings in einer
wirtschaftlichen Kontrollbeziehung, abhängig vom Anteilsbesitz, zu einem Mutterkonzern
steht. Aufgrund dieser Konstellation kann eine abgestimmte Unternehmensführung die
wirtschaftliche Gebarung des gesamten Unternehmenskonzerns beeinflussen. Um Frage-
stellungen dieser multinationalen Konzerne empirisch zu untersuchen, wurde eigens eine
Datenbank geschaffen. Diese Datenbank verknüpft Informationen über Mutter- und Toch-
tergesellschaften anhand des Anteilsbesitzes der Mutterkonzerne. Wir können damit auf
Firmenebene die wirtschaftlichen Investitionsströme darstellen. Im Wesentlichen werden
drei Fragestellungen aufgeworfen und mit Hilfe von ökonometrischen Modellen empirisch
analysiert.
Die erste Frage, die sich stellt, ist, welche Faktoren den Gesamterfolg einer Konzern-
gruppe beeinflussen und ob Tochtergesellschaften eine andere Investitionsstrategie verfol-
gen als allein operierende Unternehmen. 1 Wir stellen dabei mehrere Hypothesen über
die innerbetrieblichen Kapitalströme auf, die auf den Grundsätzen der ‘Investment Cash-
Flow’ Literatur basieren. In der Folge testen wir diese Hypothesen mit Hilfe des erstellten
Datensatzes, welcher sowohl börsennotierte als auch nicht börsennotierte Unternehmen in
82 Ländern über einen Zeitraum von 1988-2005 beinhaltet. Im Falle von Spannungen im
externen Kapitalmarkt profitiert eine Tochtergesellschaft von der Zugehörigkeit zu einem
Konzernverbund, indem der Mutterkonzern benötigte Geldmittel zur Verfügung stellt. Die
Studie zeigt, dass sowohl die Konzernstruktur als auch die institutionellen Rahmenbedin-
gungen großen Einfluss auf ein Tochterunternehmen haben.
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Die zweite Fragestellung konzentriert sich auf die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen
von Ländern, welche als Standort für Tochtergesellschaften gelten.2 Wir verwenden eine
Messgröße für institutionelle Qualität, welche sich aus den folgenden sechs Dimensionen
zusammensetzt: Mitsprache und gesetzliche Haftpflichten, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Korrup-
tionsbekämpfung, Qualität der staatlichen Regulierungsmaßnahmen, Regierungseffizienz
und politische Stabilität. Die Qualität staatlicher Institutionen beeinflusst die wirtschaft-
liche Gestaltbarkeit von Unternehmen. Firmen innerhalb eines globalen Unternehmens-
netzwerks sind von den Wirkungsbereichen verschiedener, zum Teil unterschiedlich ent-
wickelter Institutionen betroffen. Bezüglich der Wirtschaftlichkeit von Tochterunterneh-
men stellt sich die Frage, wessen Institutionen für den Erfolg ausschlaggebend sind. Sind
es die Institutionen des Landes, in welchem die Tochtergesellschaft operiert, sind es die
Institutionen des Landes der Muttergesellschaft, oder sind es gar beide? Mit Hilfe eines
Datensatzes von 23,000 weltweit agierenden, börsennotierten und nicht-börsennotierten
Unternehmungen untersuchen wir diese Fragestellung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Länder
mit starken Institutionen sich positiv auf die Wirtschaftlichkeit von Tochtergesellschaften
auswirken. Außerdem kann man einen Transfer von ‘good corporate governance’ von der
Muttergesellschaft auf die Tochtergesellschaft beobachten.
Das dritte und letzte Kapitel wirft die Frage auf, ob multinationale Unternehmungen
aufgrund ihrer Standortwahl unterschiedliche Formen des Markteintrittes wählen.3 Mul-
tinationale Unternehmen können entweder durch den Kauf von bestehenden Vermögens-
werten, Merger & Acquisition (M&A), oder durch die Neugründung von Firmenobjekten,
Greenfield Investment, in neue Märkte eintreten beziehungsweise ihren Marktauftritt aus-
bauen. Eine neuartige Methode zur Herstellung eines Datensatzes wird vorgestellt, sodass
die Form des Markteintritts von Tochtergesellschaften beobachtet werden kann. Wir stel-
len das Investitionsverhalten von Mutterkonzernen aus den U.S.A. und Europa gegenüber.
Die Ergebnisse sagen aus, dass eher unprofitable U.S. Mutterkonzerne sich dafür entschei-
den, Tochtergesellschaften zu akquirieren anstatt solche neu zu gründen. Dieses Ergebnis
kann jedoch nicht als solches direkt auf westeuropäische Mutterkonzerne übertragen wer-
den. Sowohl für U.S. als auch für westeuropäische Mutterkonzerne spielt die Güte der
Institutionen im Gastgeberland eine entscheidende Rolle.
2‘Institutional Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Subsidiaries’ Performance’ Autoren: K.Gugler,
E.Kalkbrenner, D.C.Müller and E.Peev.
3‘Acquired versus Non-Acquired Subsidiaries - Which Entry Mode do Parent Firms Prefer?’ Autor:
E.Kalkbrenner.
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